Images of la Mujer Uruguaya: Womanhood and Citizenship in the Modernizing Nation

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I. Introduction

Scholarly interest in identity politics has been widespread in recent years, ranging over a wide variety of disciplines. Of particular interest to political scientists is the issue of identity salience, especially, what determines the popularity or importance of some collective identities over others, and how political entrepreneurs manipulate collective identities to make them more or less salient within the political arena. These timely and necessary questions nonetheless ignore a key component of the impact of collective identity on contemporary politics. The question of how or why certain identities become salient while others remain dormant must be preceded by the question of from where, or what sources, modern day identities arise. That is, the question of identity construction must precede that of identity deployment. The question of how identities are constructed and deployed matters not only for the opportunity to place political movements within their historical contexts, but also for the question of their daily politics. This paper forms a part of a larger project that seeks to join these two concerns of identity construction and deployment through investigation of how racialized gender identities are constructed, understood, and later practiced by formalized Uruguayan women's organizations. Uruguay has been extremely successful (second only to Argentina) in creating a mostly white, homogenous, middle-class society that believes very strongly in the ideal of equality, regardless of race, class, religion, or other 'non-important' attributes. Yet, despite this embrace of the unimportance of ascriptive characteristics, Uruguay has produced one of the most dynamic afro-Latin political movements in Latin America, including Black World Organizations, and an active afro-Uruguayan women's/feminist group, the afro-Uruguayan women's support group. This divide between Uruguay's official discourse and its reality reflect the continual negotiations between state and members of society that are the hallmark of identity politics.

All identities are created, including that of the nation. In the Uruguayan case the state emerged well before the nation and this historical fact played a key role in the evolution of Uruguayan national identity (Bauzá 1929; González Laurino 2001, Nahum 1994). Carolina González Laurino (2001) posits that there are four historical defining moments of the Uruguayan nation: the inexistent nation, the nation of orientality, the nation of uruguayity, and the Latinized nation, a framework I adopt here.[1] As such this paper traces the parallel identity construction of women and the nation through the use of two overarching themes – womanhood and citizenship – through the end of the 1930s.[2] I focus on national identity formation and the identity formation of four distinct groups of women: upper/middle class women, afro-Uruguayan women, mestiza/gaucha women and immigrant/popular class women.[3] I adopt the Althusserian (1971) notion of interpellation to trace the evolution of raced and gendered Uruguayan women, mapping the processes of naming, negotiation, and appropriation of collective identity that occurred between women and the nation in the post-independence era. These choices allow for investigation of how each group's identity shifted over time; and their responses to elites, the state, and occasionally, to each other. I find that national identity construction in post-independence Uruguay affected distinct groups of women in different ways, marginalizing them

[1] This paper focuses on the historical evolution of raced and gendered identities. Hence I have omitted the section on the Latinized nation, which provides a bridge between the historical and the contemporary era that is the focus of the larger project.

[2] Scholars agree that the period from 1830 to 1932 constituted the height of debates about the role of the woman in society. After this, the "woman question" was considered to have been settled (Lavrin 1995; Ehrick 2005).

[3] As will be seen in the discussion below these four groups represent the upper, middle, working and lower class of women. Popular class is synonymous with working-class and is the most commonly used terminology in the Latin American region.

or extolling them based on the degree to which they met or matched the dominant perspective of the ideal woman at different points in time. This differential identity construction set the stage for distinct approaches to mobilization in the first third of the twentieth century, as well as in the contemporary era.

II. The Inexistent Nation, 1830-1870

The Uruguayan state was weak in the first forty years of independence and the nation was essentially non-existent. This period was characterized by numerous wars and uprisings, and a lack of confidence in the viability of the state and its ability to construct a sense of national belonging and allegiance among the Uruguayan population. Truncated citizenship status was the defining characteristic of all Uruguayan women's relationship to the nation-state, although their experiences with a lack of personhood varied dramatically. This section chronicles the fragility of the nation and its relationship to Uruguayan women, particularly the degree to which each distinct group of women matched the image of the ideal woman promoted by Uruguayan elites.

Uruguay became a semi- independent state in 1825 and further solidified that independence in 1828. However, it commemorates the real foundation of the state as of 1830, the year that the first constitution was written and ratified.[4] Yet, this date does not indicate the foundation of a settled nation. Civil wars raged within and around Uruguay for the next twenty-two years as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay fought over the boundaries of the respective nations and ownership of the port of Montevideo.

The rather lengthy period of Uruguayan civil wars and infighting signifies the lack of permanence that Uruguayan nationals felt at this time. The continuing existence of Uruguay as an independent state was not clear, and the constant warfare meant that the state was not free to focus on a key goal of new states: fostering the creation of a sense of the coherence within the nation, a sense of national belonging. At the foundation of the nation in 1830 Uruguay was only recently separated from its existence as part of the much larger Rio de la Plata territory, which had included the territories of Brazil and Argentina since the colonial era. There was no separate sense of *Uruguay* as a state onto itself, much less a nation capturing loyalty or a sense of belonging from its inhabitants. This was the case for much of newly-independent Latin America. Elizabeth Dore affirms "Following independence, the state virtually disappeared in Spanish America . . .elites fought among themselves not so much to control the state, which existed in name only, but to accumulate sufficient power to construct one" (Dore 2000, 14). In Uruguay, this was further exacerbated by the small size of the population. Figures from 1829 estimate the total size of the population at 74,000 (Arteaga and Puiggrós 1990).[5] What hope was there for such a small and barren land? Some forty years later the future of the country remained a dominant concern. Roberto Ibañez wrote about the state of the country in the late 1870s "We constituted the appearance of a sovereign state. And we were nothing but an audacious paradox on the map, an erasing of blood . . .[The civil wars] had exhausted the reserves of the nation: poor, miniscule, without culture or living traditions nor any possible confidence for the future" (Ibañez 1959, 23). Ibañez highlights the paradox of the early independent Uruguayan state: a place of formal existence and sovereignty, but also an empty place, literally and figuratively; a

[4] On August 25, 1825 the Provincia Oriental del Rio de la Plata (Uruguay) declared independence from Brazil and decided to adhere to a regional federation with Argentina. This led to an immediate war with Brazil which neither side won. It was eventually decided by the Treaty of Montevideo of 1828, fostered by the English, which gave birth to Uruguay as an independent state.

[5] See Appendix A for Population Statistics

place without a noticeable population and exhausted of the meager resources with which it began. Indeed, well into the early 1880s one of the major intellectual debates raging in the country was the question of whether the continued existence of a separate Uruguayan nation was desirable and feasible, or if perhaps it would not be more efficacious to join again with Argentina (Burgueño 2000).

What did this sense of paradoxical existence and emptiness mean for the women of this era? What relationship did Uruguayan women have with the newly forming state at this time? Who were the women populating the country and what did the state require of its women? Specifically, in what ways did ideas of citizenship and womanhood vary for different groups of women at the eve of independence? One trait shared among all Uruguayan females during this time period is a shared lack of citizenship. No Uruguayan female held the right to vote as dictated in the 1830 Constitution, and very few had the right to own and administer property. But how, specifically, was non-citizen status defined for and experienced by different groups of women? This is the theme I take up now.

1. Creole Women: Honor Codes

All individuals who were the direct descendants of nationals of the Spanish Crown, but born on Latin American soil, were universally referred to as Creoles. Upper- and middle-class women residing in Uruguayan territory were almost exclusively members of this particular group (Dore 2000; Lavrin 1995). From a legal and institutional perspective almost all Creole women were considered minors, a status bequeathed to them during the colonial era and one that remained intact well into the post-independence era (Canova and Almeida 1998).[6] The only exceptions to this status were certain women of the propertied classes, specifically widows or adult, unmarried women whose fathers were either deceased or who had granted them legal emancipation. Hence, very few Uruguayan women had the ability to exercise the rights of citizenship. Moreover, no Uruguayan woman had the right to vote, as decreed in the 1830 Constitution. Notwithstanding the exceptions noted above, Creole women were considered subordinate to either their fathers or husbands, who retained the capacity to act on their behalf and in their name with neither their prior permission, nor knowledge.

Nonetheless, certain Creole women fared much better than some of their North American and European counterparts, given that some did retain the right to sign contracts, ratify official documents, and make wills. Again these rights were limited to a fairly small proportion of the Creole female population, legally emancipated adult women, and widows. For the rest of the feminine population, including the majority of Creole women, slave and free black women, and indigenous and mestiza women, their fates were left in the hands of their husbands, fathers, masters, or the state.[7] This lack of a separate juridical personhood extended quite far, even to the extent of women's control, or lack thereof, over their children. Since the majority of women held no rights to separate juridical personhood, this also meant that they could not govern another person, including their children. All legal authority for the wife and child resided in the hands of the male, who exercised complete *patria potestad* in all matters. More than just a nuisance, this fact presented a real problem for quite a few women, as female heads of household were quite normal at this time (Dore 2000).

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[6] Uruguayan women won full legal equality in 1946 with the Law on Women's Civil Rights

[7] Mestizo refers to individuals of mixed white and indigenous blood. Mestiza refers to mixed white/indigenous *women* specifically.

One standard was applied equally to all Creole women, regardless of marital status. This was the prevailing honor code, which originated under the Spanish crown and remained in effect well into the post-independence era. These "honor codes" were quite similar to those in effect in the slave states of North America, although there was a stronger religious aspect regulating honor in the North American case (Fox-Genovese 1988). Honor consisted of three major characteristics: chastity, racial purity, and legitimacy. Chastity was related to the requirement of a woman's involvement in sexual relations only within the state of marriage. However, it may be better read as modesty in all things having to do with women's persons, from the full coverage of the body to the maintenance of a certain innocent and unspoiled air around all adult males to whom the woman was not immediately related.

This was a particularly important requirement for the Creole woman. In a land where the Creole was, by definition, considered inferior to, and less valuable than, a peninsular, the Creole's status on the hierarchy could be maintained only by the purity of her blood.[8] Given the Creole's need to maintain a status that brought more rights and freedoms than their mixed-blood counterparts, it comes as no surprise that this group was actually the most invested in maintaining and promulgating the use of the casta system (Rout 1976).[9] The duty to maintain and promote the Creole race near the top of the hierarchy fell to the Creole woman, where notions of purity and legitimacy would be impossible to overlook. A relationship with anyone but a Creole male, within the union of marriage, was unacceptable. In the Uruguayan case this requirement was even more imperative because of the small size of the population, and the racial balance of the population in the post-independence era. White, Creole individuals made up the majority of the population, but the black slave/free minority was a solid one-third of the population and some indicate that it was closer to fifty percent (Antón 1994; Rama 1970). Hence, in the post-independence era the honor codes for Creole women became, perhaps, even more stringent, for within them resided not only the future of the race, but the future of the country. In exchange for meeting these three characteristics Creole women were accorded protection, primarily by their fathers and husbands, and also by the state. As long as a woman's honor remained unsullied she would enjoy the protection of her close male relatives, and the maintenance of the lifestyle to which she was accustomed, for the duration of her life.

2. Negra Women: Derecho Español, and Fecundity

If Creole women experienced life as something less than full citizens, many black women experienced it as something less than full people.[10] Legal manumission occurred at several points in time, over several decades, with the first law prohibiting the practice of the slave trade in Uruguay adopted in 1812. It was followed closely by the Law of Free Birth, which granted freedom to all slaves arriving from foreign territory, in 1813.[11] However, it appears that

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[8] Peninsular refers to a person of Spanish blood born in Spain. In the legal and social system imposed by the Spanish Crown, a peninsular was at the top of the socio-racial hierarchy, followed by Creoles. Hence, a Creole could never hope to reach the top of the hierarchy as long as the Spanish Crown retained power. Moreover, the purity of their blood was their only weapon in maintaining their second place position on the hierarchy. That is, above individuals of mixed-race descent (mestizos and mulattos), of indigenous descent, or of African descent, all of whom enjoyed considerably less rights and freedoms than the Creole.

[9] The casta system is the name given to the socio-racial hierarchy proposed and implemented by the Spanish Crown.

[10] I refer to women of African descent residing within the territory of Uruguay as afro-Uruguayan, black, colored, or negra, interchangeably, in keeping with local usage. Mulatta and parda refer specifically to women of mixed-blood.

[11] The Law of Free Birth is not to be confused with legislation granting freedom to all newly-born children of enslaved parents already residing in Uruguay, which did not occur until 1825.

Uruguay was not serious about the abolition of slavery where it did not fit the needs of the landed populace, and did not enforce the laws. The major waves of manumission were not a manifestation of the government's good will. Instead manumission occurred as necessary to meet the needs of the pre-independence armies, and later the Colorado and Blanco factions, for soldiers (Antón 1994; Lewis 2003; Rodríguez 2001). Thus, in 1829 a law was passed granting freedom to any slave who had contributed personally to the cause of national freedom (Rama 1970). At several points over the next 30 years manumission was granted based explicitly on a male slave's willingness to fight. This was the case in 1841 when both Rivera and Oribe freed their slaves to help in the Long War, where they occupied the front lines of the conflict (Rama 1970). Soon after, the government began conscription of colored men into the army, regardless of their status as slave or free (Acevedo 1942**;** Canova and Almeida 1998).

This back and forth between slavery and freedom affected negra women as well, who were unable to access freedom by fighting. For many their status as property remained absolute until the last waves of abolition in 1853, when full abolition was finally granted as a "reward" to negros (Rama 1970). This last act of abolition covered all those slave women (and men) born before 1825 who would not have been freed by earlier manumission decrees or at an individual level by their masters. Even for women who had achieved manumission, their supposed freedom was quite limited. Legal restrictions known as the *Derecho Español* were in place for all free negros and mulattoes, regardless of gender, included constraints on their ability to run for and hold office, to study in the academic fields, to study in the seminary, to hold a commission, to walk around at night in towns and villages, and much more (Carvalho-Neto 1965). In addition, the *Derecho Español* limited the freedom of the negra or mulatta female, specifically, the freedom to marry whom she pleased and the freedom to wear "luxurious" goods reserved only for women of a certain social standing (Carvalho-Neto 1965). These goods often included jewelry, certain fabrics, or basically anything associated with a higher (read white) class. The negra or mulatta (and the indigenous or mestiza) woman had to be deprived of the right to wear such things because to do so would mean her intent to try to "pass" as something she was not, and would never be allowed to become. Attempts to "pass" were a grave offense at this time (Carvalho-Neto 1965). These restrictions remained in place through the end of the nineteenth century (da Luz 1995).

The restrictions in place on the right of matrimony skirt the gap between citizenship (or lack thereof in this case) and womanhood that interests us here. A slave woman's freedom was legally mandated if she married her master, became his concubine, or bore him children that he recognized (Rama 1970, 108-109). In these cases alone, manumission was compelled by law. By definition a master would not require the permission of the slave woman or anyone else to marry her and/or to enter into a sexual relationship with her. Thus, one of the conditions for black female slaves' freedom is defined by two aspects: One, the sexual nature of her body as the producer of illegitimate offspring and two, her lack of control over her body.

The most common characteristics that one notes in historical references to negra and mulatta women, whether slave or free, are those of sexuality and/or fecundity. As in North America, slave women were prized for their ability to maintain and create a cheap labor force, by means of producing offspring (Chaves 2000; Wallace-Sanders 2002). This same condition is one that might grant them a freedom that would otherwise have been denied them. For both slave and free women a major aspect of their identity was their placement, and the placement of their offspring, within the casta system. The casta system was "associated with a kind of 'animal-like' sexual conduct (promiscuous, irregular, etc.) and with the idea that children inherited not only

their parents' physical traits but also their vices" (Chaves 2000, 109). Honor codes did not apply to colored women; in fact, their identities were defined in opposition to this prevailing "ideal" of womanhood.

The casta system was a method of codifying and systematizing the degrees of illegitimacy of the offspring of colored, indigenous, and mestiza women. It was created so that the authorities could identify the degree to which sexual relationships "bettered" the population by creating individuals higher up on the scale of racial purity (e.g. moving closer to a position of honor) or denigrated the population by creating more individuals of sullied blood. Invariably the casta system is codified in terms of a male's relations with an "un"honorable female. The most well-known examples are quite commonplace: a mestizo or a mulatto. Other examples include an Indian and a half Spanish/albino woman or a lobo (wolf); an Indian man and a black woman, a Zambo; and a chino and an Indian woman a Salta atrás, or a stepback.[12] A Tenta en el Aire refers to unions between two non-whites of the same color or caste. The phrase literally means "stay in the air," suggesting that racial equality will neither be improved nor weakened (Levine 1980, 129). The casta system indicates that while the status of negra women may have varied among slave and free, she was never close to approaching the standards of idealized womanhood, which were reserved exclusively for Creole women. The quality and value of every relationship in which she was involved was subject to judgment by someone else. Again, it was Creole women who had the most to gain from enforcing the casta system and it was they who did so.

3. Indigenous/Mestiza Women: Bestiality

The position of indigenous and mestiza women at this time was not noticeably different, especially in terms of their citizenship status.[13] Just as was the case for black and mulatta women, indigenous and mestiza women had little leeway in the ability to exercise common rights of citizenship such as the right to vote or own property. In fact, although all indigenous or mestiza women were free, they faced many of the same restrictions on their movement and opportunities as did free blacks. A separate code of restrictions had been put into place long ago by Spanish Crown, and was maintained in the post-colonial era (Carvalho-Neto 1965). Those specific to women again included limits on the right to matrimony and limits on the right to wear "luxury" goods. As a matter of fact, it was the original code of the Rights of the Indian that was the basis for the code of the rights of free slaves (Carvalho-Neto 1965).

Inexistence characterized the major relationship to citizenship exercised by indigenous and mestiza women, particularly indigenous women. By 1831 landowners sought a solution to the "Indian problem," which they depicted as the inability or unwillingness of the Indian to discontinue her nomadic lifestyle and to respect property boundaries (Sztainbok 2007, 5). Ironically, the number of indigenous peoples remaining in the territory numbered in the low hundreds, at best (Nahum 1994). The population had never been very large even before the colonization of Uruguayan territory, and it was further decimated under the exigencies of colonial rule. However, by 1831 the government was ready to make good on the landowners' request. That year a call was put out by the first president of Uruguay, General Fructuoso Rivera, to the remaining 150-200 or so Charrúa families left in the national territory (Acosta y

[12] A chino is a person that is three-quarters Spanish and one-quarter mulatto.

[13] I treat the cases of mestiza and indigenous women simultaneously in reflection of their small numbers within the population. These small numbers meant that, in practice, the two were treated no differently from one another in terms of their relationship to notions of ideal womanhood and citizenship.

Lara 1998).[14] He invited them to join his troops in a fight against Brazil. Many of them accepted the invitation to fight against this common enemy. They had done so in times past, and the reward of land promised by Rivera was especially compelling (Sztainbok 2007). Instead, the Charrúa arrived at the battlegrounds to find that Rivera had prepared an ambush which was successful in clearing all but a small, remaining few of the Charrúas from the national territory. Hence, for the majority of indigenous women the exercise of citizenship, or lack thereof, was limited to a very short period. Indeed, it is likely the case that the only reason that indigenous groups were not exterminated sooner is because of the independence wars, which had preoccupied Uruguay until 1825 (Pi Hugarte 1998).[15] Hence, this sense of a lack of *groundedness* that helped motivate Uruguay's war-mongering may have been the very thing that extended indigenous existence.

Indigenous and mestiza women are known to have participated in the pre- and post-independence wars, mainly in the form of accompanying their men to the battlegrounds and setting up camp around them (Canova and Almeida 1998). However, some of them fought in battle as well, earning notoriety for their fierceness. The dominant story is that of Catalina Quintana, *La China Catalina*, who fought with the Colorados and who was described in terms of her bravery and mannishness (Ehrick 2005, 23). Her story is illustrative of the prevailing sentiment of indigenous, and particularly of the mestiza or gaucha, women of the (small) popular classes at this time.[16] She was seen as "the female counterpart of the archetypal gaucho, whose mixed blood was often pointed to as . . . evidence of barbarism" (Ehrick 2005, 23). Gaucha women (and indigenous women before them) were mostly ignored; very little is known or written about this almost invisible population. However, what descriptions of them do remain invariably refer to their ferocity or mannishness, or other terms referring to the idea of bestiality accorded to both indigenous and gaucho/gaucha peoples at this time (Burgueño 2000). If blacks were somehow less than human because of their illegitimacy and their status as property so too were these groups, who were often compared to the tiger. Tigers are beautiful from afar, but if they get too close they become a menace, a scourge to be expunged. The same fate that befell the remaining indigenous groups in the post-colonial era soon visited the gauchos as well. From the perspective of the Uruguayan elite they had to be erased from the national territory so that it could modernize; a key component of which included whitening (González Laurino 2000). So, the ideals of womanhood escaped the indigenous and gaucha woman as well, who was defined in clear opposition to the norms associated with that position.

III. Orientalidad, 1870-1900

Eventually the Uruguayan state became more politically settled and free from violence, and elites took up the project of nation-building full force. Like much of Latin America in the

[14] The Charrúa are the best known and most populous indigenous group occupying Uruguay in the pre- and post-colonial era. The other major indigenous group, the Guaraní had already succumbed to extinction with the decimation of their numbers in the colonial era and a final massacre at Caibaté 1756 (Antón 1994)

[15] Ironically, this same argument is made for why slavery finally ended when it did. The supposition is that if not for the need for a larger fighting force, slavery may have continued on for quite some time, as it did in Brazil. Brazil was the last country in the world to abolish slavery, which it did not do until 1888 and then only under severe international pressure.

[16] Gaucho is a specifically Uruguayan and Argentinean term used to refer to mestizo (and mulatto) men who roamed the interior during the early and mid- 19th century and who are often referred to in terms of their fierceness and bravery in battle and their barbarism because of their mixed blood. Gaucha, a term much less commonly used, refers to female gauchos. Gaucha and mestiza are interchangeable in Uruguayan terminology.

late 1800s, Uruguay desired to modernize itself in the image of the European republics to whom it looked for inspiration, especially England and France. Yet, one clear distinction between Uruguay and continental Europe was the former's experience of impurity, conservatism, and illegitimacy among its citizenry, resulting in a decidedly "un" modern nation. Thus, in the first phase of national identity construction, in the period from 1870 to 1900, elites took on the task of creating a national story of origins**,** erasing, modifying, and highlighting specific aspects of the national history in order to suit its needs. In essence, Uruguayan elites adopted a political resource of negation; throwing out all the aspects of the "uncivilized" nation and emphasizing the civilized. This section covers the repercussions of this impulse toward modernization as they impacted three groups of women: elite/Creole women, negra women, and popular class women. Again, the results varied dramatically among the three groups. Creole women maintained a central, if even more restricted position in society. Negra women experienced an invisibility and marginalization that remains true to the current day. The third group, popular-class women, was vital in the foundation of the new nation. These women unwittingly aided elite performance in a sleight of hand that would simultaneously erase and privilege the indigenous and gaucho populations, and replace the void with large immigrant influxes.

Fighting subsided by the 1860s, and elites were finally free to turn their attention to creating a unified nation and a sense of belonging, or nationality, among the occupants of the Uruguayan territory. This new peace was secured when the Blancos and Colorados tired of fighting and came to an agreement to divide up control of the country. The Colorados would rule over the city of Montevideo and the coastal region of the country, while the Blancos would control the interior. This internal pact set the stage for their conversion from extra-governmental political factions, to the party bases of the Uruguayan bipartisan system through the 1960s (Trigo 1990). In addition the Blancos would be paid a sum of $500,000 U.S. dollars to compensate for their losses (Trigo 1990).

This new attention towards the construction of a Uruguayan nation and an accompanying national identity mapped onto debates already raging in neighboring Argentina. Uruguayans soon adapted Domingo Sarmiento's now classic dichotomy of barbarism/civilization to their national situation.[17] All of the troubles of the nation could be described by this dichotomy of barbaridad and civilización, which served as shorthand for other longstanding divisions within the country, each one representative of the conception of barbarism and civilization. This included the rural/urban divide which divided the country spatially: in the city resided the modern, Montevidean elite; in the countryside, racial mixing was said to be unchecked and civilization unknown (Achugar and Moraña 2000; Sztainbok 2007).

Barbarism was frequently used to describe the backwards state of the gaucho; however, the span of the term was not limited solely to descriptions of mixed-blood and illegitimacy. Barbarism was a term used to refer to anything and anyone considered backwards, especially those elements of impure racial heritage (González Laurino 2000). It was also a term descriptive of obsessive ties to tradition and an unwillingness to embrace modernity, particularly by the more conservative elements of society, e.g. the traditional elites (Blancos) of the interior (Nahum 1994). The desire of the Montevidean lettered elite – the major proponents of this school of thought - was to usher in a new era of civilization that would wipe the country clean of its backwards, violent roots, and impure racial heritage. The result is what González Laurino

[17] Domingo Fausto Sarmiento was an Argentine intellectual and statesman who served as president from 1868 to 1874. He is best known for his book, *Facundo: Civilización y Barbarie* published in 1845, in which he introduces the now-classic dichotomy of barbarism versus civilization.

(2000) terms *orientalidad*. This term is reflective of Uruguay's designation as the Provincia Oriental del Río de la Plata or the Eastern Province of the River Plate. The Eastern designation refers to current day Uruguay's location east of the Uruguay River, opposite to Argentina's location west of the River. In González Laurino's usage the term *orientalidad* is meant to convey a sense of belonging to the national territory, and specifically a sense of unified belonging. *Orientalidad* represents not only the first attempt to create a strong sense of national identity among the population, but to do so in a homogeneous fashion through the creation of a new national tradition, the tradition of the civilized nation or, alternatively, a non-barbaric nation. González Laurino describes the prevailing sentiment at the time.

> Paradoxically, *orientalidad* is affirmed as a civilized space by means of a significant appropriation of its opposite (barbarism), in a mythic synthesis that is, in and of itself, a political recourse of negation. Extolling the gaucho and the caudillo as historic figures, the generation of [18]78 gave them a privileged position in the national tradition, but at the same time buried them mythically in the heroic past . . . .and erased from the present the uncomfortable presence of the 'towns of rats', formed by the vagabond gauchos expelled by the fencing of the countryside (González Laurino 2000, 33).

One of the defining characteristics of the civilization/barbarism dichotomy is the issue of how to represent the gaucho within the historic tradition. The remaining gaucho population, never a large group to begin with, was harshly repressed under the regime of dictator Lorenzo Latorre (1876-1880). He utilized restrictive policies of fencing the countryside to protect the property rights of land-owners, coupled with legislation that outlawed vagrancy and delinquency. This legislation aimed to control and reduce the gaucho/mestizo population and to rid would-be caudillos (strongmen) of followers, which meant their inability to corral forces for aid in uprisings against the government (Burgueño 2000). By the late 19th century elites had achieved their goal. The country was free of any noticeable indigenous and mestizo/gaucho population, and a pattern of perceptible European immigration had begun by the 1840s (see Appendix A, Table 8)

But, this left the problem of how to represent the foundation of the nation historically. The Indians and gauchos were eradicated precisely because of the backward and the mongrel natures they represented, but now elites were left with the task of creating a compelling story that would explain and legitimize their "disappearance". The response to this problem came not, primarily, from the government or political elites, but from the well-known intellectuals of the era, who took on the task of creating a new historical imaginary that would be acceptable to a civilized nation (Alvarez and Caetano 1994, Burgueño 2000). Intellectuals achieved this task through the location of the Charrúa and the gaucho in a remote past that belied their very recent extermination. The aging of their extinction was crucial. Too intimate a tie with the current population would indicate a lack of purity that would make the project of the Creole elites impossible: the construction of a "new" univocal, centralized, rational, stable nation-state, capable of rejecting possible contradictory fissures, e.g. a modern nation (Caetano and Rilla 1994).

This distancing was achieved most notably by Uruguayan national poet Juan Zorilla de San Martín in his epic poem, *Tabaré* ([1888] 1956). In *Tabaré* Zorilla de San Martín tells the story of *Tabaré,* a story centered on a white, Spanish woman who bears a mestizo child (Tabaré) as a result of her rape by a Charrúa chief. It is the story of the young man who, because of his racial heritage, is both timid and brave, handicapped and powerful; and most importantly, who is

overwhelmed and made strong by his love for Blanca, a name that is defining of the character with whom Tabaré falls in love, and the race to which she pertains.[18] Central to his story is an emphasis on the "new" origins of the nation, as specifically Spanish and white (Burgueño 2000). In Zorilla de San Martin's epic poem the nation is populated and represented by a pure-bred white race that has dominated over the degenerate Indian. He asserts "[Tabaré is the] personification of dead lineage . . . [the white race] has remained alive on top of the cadaver of the Charrúa" (quoted from Burgueño 1996, 4; translation mine). At the same time certain aspects of the Charrúa are celebrated, specifically his courageous spirit and his valor. Sztainbok notes the persistence of this image even in the current day where "the claiming of the *garra charrúa*, the 'Charrúa claw' describes the strength of Uruguayan character, particularly the nation's prowess in soccer" (Sztainbok 2007, 17).[19] Burgueño affirms

> The representation of the Indian, based on opposites, forms part of the conceptual content of the poem that seeks to create a referential image of identity for the uruguayan nation, one an indigenous race of which it inherits certain positive attributes, and at the same time marks its [the indigenous race's] extinction, its inexistence in a 'white' 'fatherland' (Burgueño 1996, 116).

González Laurino seconds this notion, noting that the image of the indomitable Charrúa, situated in a remote antepasado (ancestry) was the sustaining image of the collective representation of *orientalidad* (González Laurino 2000, 167).

Hence, the Montevidean elite set the stage for the first wave of modernization and the new imaginary of the nation that accompanied it. They placed the Charrúa in a remote ancestry while rescuing a few important traditions. It was the first attempt at a national story that tied everyone to a shared, if remote, historical past. This search for a new historical tradition to accompany the creation of a new, modern nation is underscored by the importance of ideologies of positivism that enraptured Uruguay at this time (Ardao 1956). Indeed, positivism captivated all of Latin America at this time, though its specific form and influence varied by context. In the Uruguayan case the positivist ideological tradition was strongly associated with Darwinian and Spencerian, and could be summed up in one word: evolutionism (Ardao 1950).[20]

This new impulse toward modernization had specific repercussions for each of the three groups of women that interest us here: Upper- and middle-class women (Creole women); black women; and women of the popular class; particularly in terms of a new ideal of womanhood and the relationship that each group would have to said ideal. Within the prevailing dichotomy of civilization/barbarism and urban/rural some contrasting and quite distinct images of the feminine emerged. Elites employed sharp distinctions such as good/bad; saint/sinner; selfless/frivolous;

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[18] Blanca means white in Spanish.

[19] Uruguay won the World Cup twice, in 1930 and 1950. Only Brazil, Germany, and Italy have won more (Argentina also won twice) and only 7 countries in the world can boast of a World Cup win in the history of the tournament (France and England round out the 7).

[20] The terminology ideologies of positivism is meant to reflect the dual analyses of positivism as it was originally introduced, and its mapping onto eugenics debates, sometimes referred to as "social positivism." The original use of the term positivism reflected the idea that science can only proceed through direct observation, that progress is inevitable, and that progress occurs in stages (evolutionism). Social positivism took a number of forms, but generally assigned moral hierarchies to those aspects of social life that were understood to be negative or positive for the achievement of progress; usually the progress of a nation, a race, or a people. For instance, black was bad, evil, retrogressive; white was good, pure, progressive. In Uruguay ideologies of positivism were attached to three major issues: religion (retrogressive/bad) vs. secularism (progressive/good); non-white (retrogressive/bad) vs. white (progressive/good); and traditionalism/conservatism (retrogressive/bad) vs. liberalism/cosmopolitanism (progressive/good).

submissive and feminine/rebellious and virile; hardworking and sacrificing/useless and lazy, to judge the relative merits of women and to describe the feminine image (Sapriza 1983, 118).

1. Creole Women: Disciplining

Ironically, for Creole women, the new impulse towards modernization and civilization resulted in greater restrictions on their already limited freedoms. Specifically, elites associated civilization with a necessity to repress the natural inclinations of the human being, and new conceptions of behavior and comportment that concerned the most diverse aspects of public and private daily life (Ines de Torres 1995, 56). Barrán terms this trend *disciplining*, a fact of all social life at the time, but a trend that carried especially firm and specific expectations for women (Barrán 1990). He notes "the bourgeois . .. .assumed the roles, the valors, the conduct, the language, and the gestures of the masculine image of the woman, and he made her childlike, infantilizing her" (Barrán 1990, 183; translation mine). For instance, it was in the early part of the period of *orientalidad* that the Uruguayan government reaffirmed the Uruguayan woman's dependence on her husband and/or father with passage of the Civil Code of 1868. The Civil Code of 1868 officially legalized what had previously been a quasi-official practice: the lack of juridical personhood for most women with the exception of widows and legally emancipate minors described earlier.

At the same time, a great deal of responsibility was placed on the woman, concurrent with a change in thought about her reproductive roles. In the "primitive" era, the country was a "population void;" and the woman's major responsibility was that of a biological reproducer of the race, with biological reproduction of the workforce the primary goal (Sapriza 1983). Now, in the face of a "full" country, due to the noticeable increase of European immigrants, women's role became that of a social reproducer. She ensured sufficient socialization of the next generation such that it would be adequately prepared to meet the civilized requirements of the modern nation (Sapriza 1983).

This shift in the primary role of the Uruguayan wife and mother was accompanied by some early debates over the importance of women's education. If the woman was to be the first and one of the most important influences of the lives of her children, then she should, perhaps, be educated enough to provide the children with some basic education in the home (Ardao 1950). This was the position of José Pedro Varela's, a well-known Uruguayan intellectual and statesman. He took on the task of educational reform and oversaw the extension of educational opportunities throughout the territory; he was staunch in his conviction that equal educational opportunity should be shared by (almost) all Uruguayan nationals (Varela [1876] 1964).[21] In regards to women Varela was quite progressive; he hosted a three day conference in 1869 called "Of the rights of the woman" where he advocated that society should educate the woman and place her at the same height as the man, thereby doubling the intellectual capacity of the society

[21] Various scholars have noted Varela's antipathy to blacks, to whom he professed to object, not because of their race but their inferior social class (Rama 1970, Rout 1976). Of course the point of his legislation was precisely to introduce education to all members of the society, including the "inferior classes." Perhaps the more honest version of his thought is captured by Sapriza (n.d.) who notes "influenced by ideas of positivism José Pedro Varela sustained that the equality of the races was a falsehood." This exchange illustrates the types of sleight of hand that often occurs around race in Uruguay; that is the public objection to something or someone as inferior based on class or some other acceptable prejudice, accompanied with a private opinion of racial inferiority (Foster 1999)

(Larrobla 1986).[22] Many disagreed with this notion, preferring instead to emphasize the "feminine" qualities of women, which most certainly did not include an education equal to that of a man. Instead qualities considered feminine at this time were "beauty, and a certain infantile air (the woman was always a minor), with a few touches of sophistication and frivolity" (Sapriza 1983, 126). Indeed, this new tradition of *disciplining* had the effect of creating a bit of confusion over the role of the woman**.** Canova and Almeida and Almeida affirm "the woman was confronted now with a domination that was more subtle and more difficult to identify, that obligated her to identify her necessities, without even having comprehended what those were" (Canova and Almeida 1998, 28; translation mine).

2. Negra Women: Marginalization and Invisibility

Black women also found themselves in a curious position at the beginnings of the modern era. Manumission was finally granted to all slaves; all were free. It is not clear how large the black/mulatta population was at this time. Many black and mulatto males had lost their lives in the civil wars and many black and mulatta women had entered into relationships - willful and coerced - with non-black men, thereby creating a new generation of mixed-blood and illegitimate children (Rama 1970). However, while these new generations were certainly not white, they were not necessarily black either, given that racial lineage in Latin America is not determined by the one-drop rule as is the case in North America.[23] Varying degrees of skin color and class affiliation meant that someone phenotypically darker than another black person might still be counted as white depending on his or her personal circumstances (Rout 1976). Theoretically this tradition was always applicable in Uruguay, but in the pre- and early post-independence era there was quite a bit of hostility to the idea of social climbing on the part of Creole elites who had a vested interest in maintaining a strict casta society with themselves at the top (Rama 1970).

However, by the late 1800s the immigrant population had swelled to more than forty percent of the total population; the desired whitening and purifying of the population had begun full-force (Rodríguez 2001). This also meant that the majority of new mulatto offspring would mostly likely be the combination of a black or mulatta woman and an immigrant male, as opposed to the black female/landed Creole male coupling that was the norm prior. This race-mixing was not nearly as problematic for two reasons. First, the sheer dominance of the immigrant class over the black and mulatto class meant that the children of mixed-blood could never accumulate to any noticeable number within the population, and it was likely the case that each new generation would become successively lighter/whiter because of the fluidity of relationships at the popular class level. Second, unlike the early post-independence era, where recognition of the children of white and black unions would have required the creation of a mixed-blood middle- and upper-class (since white men at the time would have belonged almost

[22] The Law of Common Education was passed in 1877 and created a free, obligatory, secular, and coeducational system of education in the Republic under Education Minister, José Pedro Varela. However, many women were still excluded from education opportunities by custom if no longer by law (Canova and Almeida 1998).

[23] The terminology "one-drop rule" is a commonly used euphemism in the United States and reflects the way that racial lineage is traced in the U.S. where one drop of black blood means that a person is black, regardless of phenotypic appearance. Moreover, in most cases the members of that person's immediate family are also often considered black, especially close blood relatives and spouses, who became black by association. This is opposed to the more common Latin American tradition in which blackness is fluid and contextual. Hence the observation that one may be black in a certain social context, but not in another; or that wealth or status reduces or erases blackness entirely. The understanding of blackness as fluid is the basis for mixed families, such that one finds persons who claim to have a black cousin, grandparent, or even parent, but does not claim blackness for him or herself.

solely to those particular class positions), black and white unions now resulted in placement of the child as a member of the popular class, just like her parents. Thus, social hierarchies were not damaged.

Very little is known about either male or female afro-Uruguayans during this time period. This lack of information is in keeping with the prevailing mode of thought about their position in the early modernizing era and their positions in the current era. That is, a position of invisibility. Uruguayan elites did not feel it necessary to violently exterminate afro descendants in the same way they had the indigenous and gaucho populations. da Luz (1995) credits afro-Uruguayan survival to their "profound importance in the country's everyday life . . . and because they did not constitute a real force of opposition, because they were not organized; they had stronger ties with their owners than among themselves" (da Luz 1995, 334). The Indian and the gaucho were both eradicated because of their supposed blight on the purity of the nation. They were also difficult for Creole elites to contain. I have already referred to elite concerns that neither the Indians nor the gauchos respected property boundaries and roamed where they pleased; and their renown for indomitability and ferocity. They were extolled for these characteristics *after* their extermination; before, they were problematic. Blacks and mulattoes did not share these characteristics. With the exception of a few stories of slaves who tried to kill their masters, I am unaware of widespread perceptions of blacks and mulattoes as ungovernable or difficult to contain (Merino 1982). Nothing in the history of blacks in Uruguay would indicate that elites would have any reason to fear them or to feel that they could not dominate them. Perhaps the desire to exterminate yet another minority population was quelled for these reasons.

Beyond this, the role of the massive European immigration occurring in the country whitened the population by increasing the numbers of whites in the country; moreover, it also directly reduced the black and mulatto population in terms of simple proportion. Hence this massive immigration inaugurated the process of invisibility for black and mulatta women as it literally bled them out of the population.

A rapid process of *blanquamiento* (whitening) took place. The non- discriminating 'colour-blindness' of the government's discourse and policies resulted not in equity but in a subtle form of racism . . .Thus, 'invisibility' became the official policy. . . . young Afro-Uruguayans today will find that their nation's history records only one black person: the loyal soldier Ansina (da Luz 1995, 342).[24]

This general demographic process was also aided by the preferences of the elite. Whereas before black women had worked as maids, laundresses, ironers, pastry makers, domestic servants, and like positions, a clear preference for giving these jobs to white females emerged (Rodríguez 2001). This shift in preferences and its accompanying economic displacement was not nearly as severe for black and mulatta females as it was for black males, who were pushed out of their traditional positions as handymen and factory workers. However, it occurred among both sexes and had the further effect of pushing blacks out of the national imaginary, both economically and socially.

As I have noted repeatedly, European immigration became noticeable as early as the 1840s in Uruguay. It was interrupted somewhat by the civil wars that plagued the country during the 1850s and 1860s, but then it picked up where it left off. By 1890 the government actively supported the immigration it had always welcomed and solicited, through direct subsidization of

[24] Ansina fought alongside José Gervasio Artigas, "liberator" of the Río de la Plata, who was alternately depicted as a traitor and a hero at various points during his lifetime. Ansina was his most noted aide and remained with him for his entire life.

the passage of European immigrants (Rama 1970; Rodríguez 2001). Only four years prior, in 1886, the Uruguayan parliament passed legislation that strictly prohibited any Asiatic or African immigration into the country (República Oriental de Uruguay 1930). This law was reinforced by an 1888 immigration bill which again specifically prohibited any Asiatic or African immigration into the country at any time and for any reason, and promised to levy a penalty of 100 pesos per person on any ship captain who defied this order (Cámara de Representantes 1888).[25]

3. Popular Class Women: The Foundation of the New Nation

The result of this massive integration was a total shift in the members of the popular class, which in the post-independence era was inhabited by the gaucho/mestizo minority, and was now overwhelmingly white and first-generation European (González Laurino 2000). New popular class women embodied a position somewhere in between that of the ideal woman and the invisible and impure black woman. Simply by virtue of their whiteness they occupied an important place in the new popular imaginary, and thus were subject to the feminine dichotomies noted earlier (Ehrick 2005). Elite concern rested on the fact that European popular class women would be the most numerous "social reproducers" of the nation. Thus, the need to for them to identify with and to promote the new civilizing tendencies of the nation was supreme. However, their status as recent immigrants meant that, though they were white, they were most certainly not equal to the Creole elite (Rovira 1950). They were better than what was available locally, and their immigration was needed because of the smallness of the early Uruguayan population, but it would be some time before they would come to be accepted as equals within the nation, and thirty years before the first of their ranks would be considered Uruguayan (Oddone 1966; Taglioretti 1984).[26] Their inferiority was further compounded by the fact that they were from the "second-rate" Southern European countries, mostly of Spain and Italy. While the Creole elites were also, and very proudly, of Spanish descent, they were of the Spain that reigned supreme and exercised her power over much of the world through colonization. The Spain, and Italy, of the late 1800s was quite a different and less illustrious place, or so went common thought (Levine 1980). Moreover, the immigrants were of the lowest classes of Europe. Gallego is a common term used to describe immigrants at this time and evokes images of a "Spanish peasant immigrant, who [is] stereotypically considered to be undernourished, with raven-black hair, and stingy. Gallegos are supposed to exploit and dominate their children, and favor honest work over education" (Levine 1980, 55). Typically a hard-working nature would not seem a bad trait for an immigrant. However, this was the height of the modernizing trend in Uruguay. For Uruguayan elites modernization required education, specifically the creation of a massive, cultured, lettered population, and this was the very task in which the new immigrant was supposed to be involved (Ardao 1950).

Hence, the new immigrants were one of the last phases in the evolutionary cycle of the country, with only one or two steps remaining to the realization of the elite's grand goals. Immigrant women were subject to prevailing feminine dichotomies of the time to a degree, but these contrasts were mostly applied to women of the elite class; the most important social reproducers at that time (Ines de Torres 1995). The women of the popular class would not become totally invocated in this project until the next phase of *uruguayity*, to which I turn now.

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[25] This legislation was still in effect as late as 1956, which is the last direct reference to it that I have found. It is likely that the law is still on the books although it may not actually be enforced any longer.

[26] I am referring to the extension of universal male suffrage, which was achieved in 1917.

IV. *Uruguayity*, 1900-1932

Uruguay continued with and increased its efforts to modernize the nation in the first third of the twentieth century. The second phase of the modernization project was spearheaded by the Colorado Party and its most famous leader, José Batlle y Ordoñez. His *Batllismo* program presided over a power shift from a more dispersed elite to a centralized state; and a shift in the dominant, now state-led image of the ideal woman, from privileged and Creole to middle-class and professionally trained. This period also marks the beginning of the negotiation phase of the causal chain, as women's activism and organizing increased. Elite and middle-class women challenged the government arguing for and against suffrage and women's role in society. Negra and popular-class women organized in their own ways although formal organizing or mobilization among these groups was much less frequent, perhaps in reflection of the extra burdens they carried. Governmental elites continued to ignore negra women, moved away from a reliance on Creole women, and elevated middle-class, and popular-class women in keeping with the modernizing mission they set forth.

By the turn of the century the modernizing impulse had begun full force. The civilizing process undertaken by the national elite achieved some successes, especially in initiating the centralization of the nation around the capital of Montevideo (home of the modern, intellectual elite); and in creating a new, white mass base through the open-door (European) immigration policy (Caetano and Alfaro 1995). This new civilizing process also included the first shifts away from concerns of racial purity and a move towards class as the only politically correct social distinction "perhaps even a sign of modernity" (Rama 1970, 48). But there was still much progress to be made in the formation of Uruguay as an enlightened and modern nation equal to those of the European continent, particularly France and England. Hence, the second stage of the modernizing project began.

González Laurino terms this third stage in the historical imaginary of Uruguay: *uruguayity* (González Laurino 2000, 18). That is, a project that continued the mission of modernization through the lens of an increasingly centralized, pure, and intellectual society; a project that encouraged particular attention to integrating the new popular masses. The ultimate goal was the creation of a sense of "uruguayaness" among all sectors of the society. This integrationist project of *uruguayity* would develop around certain key elements, particularly the image of a cosmopolitan, universalist, secular nation (González Laurino 2000).

This next stage in the modernizing project of the Uruguayan elite was soon synonymous with *Batllismo*, the program of Uruguay's most significant political figure, José Batlle y Ordoñez (1856-1929), and the Colorado Party. Batlle y Ordoñez served as president from 1903 to 1907 and again from 1911 to 1915. During the first 29 years of the century, either in his service as president or as the head of the Colorado Party, he instituted a series of reforms in a successful drive to make Uruguay the first welfare-state in the continent of Latin America. Uruguay was well ahead of even some of its North American and European counterparts in its attention to the needs of it working-class and poorer citizen. These reforms ranged the gamut from divorce legislation (1907), unemployment compensation (1914), and an eight-hour workday (1915), to workers pensions (1919) and much more, culminating with the passage of universal female suffrage in 1932.[27]

Although Batlle is the most well-known figure tied to the program of *Batllismo* and the *Batllista* state, this program of reformism and consolidation by the government was really the project of the entire Colorado party. The party sought dominance in the creation of the new

[27] For more on Batllismo and its welfare-state expansion see Vanger 1980

cosmopolitan and universalist nation, and achieved this goal through a politics of absorption (Vanger 1980; Zum Felde 1967).[28] Perelli confirms " . . . in the decade of 1910 one of the ideological principles of *batllismo* sustained, 'we must make the Colorado Party a party so liberal that it makes the Liberal Party unnecessary, and so humanistic that it makes the Socialist Party obsolete'" (Perelli 1985, 7). The goal of the Colorado Party and of the mission of *batllismo* was to make a party apparatus so open that it could sustain a variety of distinct ideological traditions all at the same time. In fact, the party apparatus was so open that it could contain not only the liberal and socialist trends of the time, but even more conservative societal elements (Ehrick 2005). In this way the Colorado, and to a lesser extent the Blanco, party achieved a catch-all status that would allow it to retain an uninterrupted power until 1959.[29] The party was aided by the introduction of the double-simultaneous vote in 1925, which allowed each party to arrange lists by political faction. This meant that members of the same party could break off and form new lists, thereby allowing rival factions to run against each other at the same time as they ran for president.[30]

More importantly, this meant that the Colorado Party would be quite successful in its reformist mission to absorb major political trends and ideological factions within its ranks (González 1991). As a result of the expansive *Batllismo* reformist plan, Uruguayan civil society would never become a particularly strong force, and much of social and civil life was and is closely tied to the political and party system. Christine Ehrick notes that the "Batllista state anticipated, rather than responded to, the emergence of an organized civil society and a vocal middle class" (Ehrick 2005, 7). In this way, the era of *uruguayity* was also reflected by a shift in power and control from a more dispersed elite to a specifically governmental elite. Thus, the centralization considered so vital to a successful modernization process shifted from the concern of a dispersed, public and private elite force to a more explicitly politicized, governmental centralization of power and society.

The relationship between women and the evolving nation-state changed quite a bit at this time. Three specific trends are noted. First, the image of the ideal woman shifted quite a bit and came to reside primarily with the women of the new middle-class; and to a slightly lesser extent, the women of the popular class. Universal female suffrage was also achieved during this period, along with other laws that finally granted the Uruguayan woman a place among the national citizenry, in opposition to her prior, truncated position as solely an Uruguayan national. Tied very closely to the shift in the image of the ideal woman was the second major trend of the new relationship between women and the nation-state. That is the role of the woman, particularly the popular-class woman, as central to the mission of *uruguayity*, e.g. the creation of a sense of a unified and homogenous population. Finally, the Uruguayan woman exercised her collective voice for the first time; women's activism and organizing and the first-wave of feminism began during this era and helped to shape the relationship of women and the state.

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[28] *Batllismo* refers to the social reformist Batllista political faction within the Colorado Party; a faction that dominated the Colorado Party agenda for much of the twentieth century. I use *Batllismo* and *Batllista* interchangeably to refer to this dominant trend.

[29] The Colorado Party ruled continuously from 1868-1959.

[30] The president was the number one person on the most-voted for faction list meaning that the number of presidential candidates could be almost infinite. Moreover, individual factions often made secret agreements among themselves to combine votes. This was a legal option under Uruguayan election rules until the 1996 electoral reform. The result is that citizens were often unsure of for exactly whom they were voting. It is primarily through use of these electoral options that the Colorados were able to maintain electoral dominance for so many years.

1. Creole Erasure and Middle-Class Replacement

The era of *uruguayity* would signal the demise of the dominance of the elite Creole woman in Uruguayan society. Although she played an important role in the early women's movement, specifically up to the early 1920s, the elite Creole woman would eventually be replaced in importance by the middle-class, professional woman. It was the middle-class professional woman that would be the cornerstone of the *Batllista* program for a secular and modernized state (Lavrin 1995). At the turn of the century feminine and feminist organizing was still more or less nonexistent. This changed in 1906 when the *Liga de Damas Católicas del Uruguay* (The Catholic Ladies' League, hereafter referred to as the Liga), was formed in direct response to the removal of crucifixes and all other religious images from public hospitals (Carreras de Bastos 1909). These elite women were kept busy by the passage of divorce legislation in 1907, which catalyzed a petition drive resulting in the collection of some 93,000 signatures (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984).[31] This early momentum set the stage for elite women's organizing, and other organizations followed, including the Association of Marriages in 1908, the Pro-Mother's Association in 1915 and numerous other social-assistance organizations. These were the first privately run, elite, female, charitable associations of the time and they were founded on two general principles. One, the extension of the privilege of the *noblesse-oblige* to those less fortunate. Two, lessons on strong moral character to lower classes that were, at best morally misguided and at worst, morally corrupt (Ehrick 2005). Hence, organizations like the Mutual Aid Society and the Liga gave health and hygiene instruction to women of the popular class (specifically female factory workers); solicited funds to allow poor-women to afford a wedding and decrease illicit relationships; and much more (Cassina de Nogara 1989).

Ten years later the mission had shifted from more isolated acts of charity to groups organized specifically around the goal of continuous charitable assistance to the needy and misguided masses. For instance, the Pro-Mother's Association founded a home for "deserving" unwed mothers and their illegitimate children, and sought to decrease the number of illegitimate unions by offering strong moral persuasion and financial help to young, unmarried couples (Ehrick 2005, 111). Ironically these elite, conservative women cited state financial aid as a part of the reason for their existence. Ehrick notes "The state . . . provided significant financial resources subsidizing the work of Pro-Matre and other women's beneficent associations. In return, these associations were entrusted with carrying out social assistance, effectively making these women agents of the Batllista welfare state" (2005, 92).

In fact, the *Batllista* state was quite concerned with creating or aiding in projects that decreased the burden of the working class woman and helped integrate her into the society. This attitude is very much in keeping with the *Batllista* notion that the Uruguayan woman was central to the creation of the newly, modernized state (Cassina de Nogara 1990). For instance, it is a widely agreed-upon fact that the 1907 divorce law had as much to do with wrecking the clerical base of the Church as it did with the rights of women (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). The thought was that the move to a secular society would require the breaking of the women's

[31] The 1907 divorce legislation allowed for uncontested divorce in the case of *all* female adultery, or in the case of male adultery only if it occurred in the marital home. It also provided for divorce in the case of violence, imprisonment and other specific clauses. It was soon followed by 1912 legislation that allowed for divorce by the sole will of the woman.

religious ties to the Church; instead fostering her strong ties to the state (Ardao 1962; Vanger 1980).[32]

The state's success in breaking the Church's ecclesiastical base opened the way for it to step in and take over what was previously the Church's role. This was a part of the larger *Batllista* "compensation" policy or the idea that the state had to compensate for social and economic inequality so as to promote social harmony and order (Ehrick 2005, 72). Compensation began with the states sponsorship of privately run ladies charitable organizations such as the ones noted. However, public officials soon began to express discomfort with the placement of such activities in the hands of elite women. By the late 1920s some state bureaucrats openly favored replacing the private ladies' associations with professionally trained staff. The state had desired this for some time, but the lack of a widespread group of educated women precluded the possibility. Ehrick asserts ". . .policy formulation prematurely anticipated the existence of a supporting class structure needed to create the cadre of bureaucrats and professionals that reformers had envisioned" (Ehrick 2005, 110). Although Varela's co-educational legislation was enacted in 1877, custom still prohibited most women from more than a basic education (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1988). In response to this problem the *Batllistas* created a "Women's University," a separate women's institution charged with the task of making women feel "comfortable" and protected (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984).

This shift in the goals of the state coincided with the appearance of a stronger liberal, middle-class feminist movement. The liberal feminist movement was in place as early as 1906 with the foundation of the Liberal Ladies Association and the entrance of the founding mother of feminism, María Abella de Ramírez, in 1907 (Rodríguez Villamil 1995). However, both the Liberal Ladies Association and Ramírez had strong ties to Argentine feminism, and were primarily connected with the Argentine feminist movement. The first locally based Uruguayan liberal women's association did not appear until 1911, with the creation of the Emancipation Women's Association. This organization and the one that followed it, the Uruguayan Section of the Pan-American Federation founded by Abella de Ramírez, were both short-lived and tumultuous (Cassina de Nogara 1989). The primary tie among the organizations' members was an opposition to the Church, which would not prove strong enough to unite disparate groups like middle-class women and anarchists.

The first long-lasting liberal organization was the National Council of Uruguayan Women (Conamu), a branch of the International Council of Women, founded by Paulina Luisi in 1916. Luisi was, in many ways, the ideal embodiment of the secular, modernized *Batllista* state (Cassina de Nogara 1989; Lavrin 1995; Sapriza 1983). She was the first women in the country to complete medical school in 1909 and served as an image of the model Uruguayan woman: middle-class, professional and educated. In a description of Luisi Ehrick notes, "All of these views [anticlerical upbringing, medical training, party affiliation] help underscore Luisi's connections to Uruguayan state formation: a product of the liberal secular state, who in turn saw that state as principal force for the improvement of women's lives and society in general" (Ehrick 2005, 98). The modern woman was the primary source of the "irreversible advance of progress" that would bring forth improvements for all women, and in turn for the country at large. The development of the middle-class women was central to the modernizing project of the nation. Large increases in the availability of secondary schooling and education, and active campaigns for civil and political rights were the key tools employed by the *Batllista* state to achieve this goal (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1988).

[32] Official separation of the Church and State was secured in the 1917 Constitution.

2. Negra Women: Invisibility Continued

Shifts in the image of the ideal women did not signal a change in the reception of black women in Uruguayan society. No official statistics are available for this time period, but it is likely that the afro-Uruguayan population was nearing the roughly 6 percent of the population that they constitute today, down from a high of one-third of the total population as late as the 1850s.[33] For black women the continuing trend was one of invisibility, coupled with a continuing outsider status in definitions of the ideal woman. This position was complicated by the fact that no real black middle-class existed at this time (or at any time). Ironically, the lack of de jure segregation like that experienced in the United States or South Africa meant that people of color remained dispersed and un-unified, specifically in economic terms. Blacks of the time certainly felt this condition. One gentleman who was born around 1926 stated

> Of course, the negro had been a slave. . .. myself, my mother, and my grandmother in slavery, three generations. It existed because it had always existed. The negro had always known inferiority, he knew inferiority. . . . He was not in the technical areas, he was not in the organized disciplines, there were no doctors, no architects, he was in the lowest tasks (Porzecanski and Santos 1994, 98; translation mine).

The result, ironically, is that there existed no noticeable independent black elite.[34] Even as late as the 1960s Ildefonso Pereda Valdes, the most significant writer of afro-Uruguayan history in the country, noted the existence of only two or three families that integrated the upper-middle class, the highest social rank that anyone in the country has ever achieved, even through the current day (Pereda Valdes 1965; Rodríguez 2001).

For black women the lack of a black middle class meant a triple invisibility, very similar to analyses of triple jeopardy that poor black women experience in the United States (Giddings 1984; King 1995).[35] However, in the Uruguayan case, this invisibility or jeopardy was consistent across the *entire* female population of color. This status is reflected in a series of interviews that Teresa Porzecanski and Beatriz Santos did with people of color in the early 1990s, some of whom ranged from 8 to 25 in the time period under discussion, some of whom were not yet born by 1932. In every case but one, the mothers, grandmothers, aunts, and sisters of the individuals interviewed were employed in the domestic sphere; in the case of female interviewees the women themselves were employed in the domestic sphere. The one exception to this was the mother of a young woman who was one of those rare anomalies; the child of a black middle-class family.[36] Her mother owned a small bookstore for the duration of her

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[33] No official statistics are available because the Uruguayan government, like the rest of Latin America, considered it racist to catalog individuals by race, and ceased to do so by the middle of the 19th century. For more on possible reasons for the sharp decline of the afro population see Antón (1994) and Rodríguez (2001)

[34] The black "middle class" at this time was almost non-existent, although there was a small cadre of individuals who had attained "better" jobs. These were public employees at the rank of doorman, chauffeur, and sweeper, and they maintained a certain hierarchy because of the stable nature of their employment and their paycheck (Porzecanski and Santos 1994. "Ruben." P. 92)

[35] The concept triple jeopardy refers to the triple oppression of many African-American on the basis of their race, sex, and class status. Hence, the common refrain: poor, black, and female. The term became popular in the 1970s. A number of black women used the term in slightly different ways (sometimes substituting imperialism for class) in their writing and speaking. It is unclear who originally coined the term. The Third World Women's Alliance and the National Black Feminist Organization are some of its earliest referents.

[36] Even for this family middle-class status was more a product of luck than anything else. When the father's family was broken up due to a fire on the ranch where his mother worked as a *peon*, each child was parceled off to someone else in the area. He ended up with another ranch owner who taught him photography, a skill he later turned into a profession. It is likely that his siblings did not fare as well (Porzecanski and Santos 1994. "Margarita." Pp. 51-57).

marriage, although even she originally took in ironing and worked as a laundress, a position to which she returned as a widow (Porzecanski and Santos 1994, 57). Historically, the black female performed the most inferior tasks and this status did not change post-slavery; nor has it changed much in the present tense (GAMA 1997; Malvasio n.d.). This created a sense of invisibility that is noted by some people of color in Uruguay. Angelica affirms ". . . the theme of racism and of the treatment of all the rest, locates the black in a place that is not visible. This is a characteristic of the black collectivity: its invisibility" (Porzecanski and Santos 1994, 110).

Members of the black collectivity did attempt to organize and better their positions. Black newspapers and cultural groups began as early as 1872, with the founding of the journal *La Conservación*. *La Conservación* was a voice of resistance and uplift that protested against racism in Uruguayan society and took on a decidedly militant tone for that time period (Lewis 2003). The most well-known of these newspapers was *Nuestra Raza* or *Our Race*, which ran from 1917 to 1948, and had the most profound impact on afro-Uruguayan intellectual life (Ferreira 2003; Lewis 2003). This magazine served as a center for black political and social life through the publication of poetry and cultural criticism, the posting of announcements for black events, intellectual articles, reports on black organizing in other parts of the world (particularly in the U.S.) and eventually, through the sponsorship of the country's first and only black political party, the Partido Autóctono Negro or the Black Autochthonous Party (PAN).

Overall, black women were not particularly active in the writing and dissemination of *Nuestra Raza* or within the activities on which it regularly reported. It is likely that the lack of black, female participation in *Nuestra Raza* was partially the result of the same double burden cited in explanation of the lack of noticeable feminine activity in the parties and organizations of the working class, such as the Socialist and Communist parties. The double burden of worker by day and mother and housewife by night leaves very little time for other activity outside the home (Ehrick 2005). Nonetheless, some black women were instrumental within the ranks of *Nuestra Raza* and its accompanying social mission, and urged other black women to become more involved for the betterment of the race. In a note to "the women of our race" "Chichita" pleads

> we need an organ for people of color like we need bread . . .it is very important . .. This thing of having to feed our children with the un-intellectual satiety of the white women is hateful, unpleasant**,** and anti-black. It is to not know ourselves, to believe ourselves incapable of elaborating, our own happiness. . . ¡Let's go! We can do a little for ourselves (*Nuestra Raza* 25 August 1933, 10; translation mine).

It appears that these appeals fell on mostly deaf ears, as no visible feminine presence was ever detected in *Nuestra Raza*.

Instead, the majority of black female activity reported within the pages of *Nuestra Raza* dealt with picnics, dances, or other cultural activities hosted by the ladies' of a certain group or area. This more *feminine* behavior met with the approval of the men of *Nuestra Raza*, who supported it with the introduction of "feminine pages" in 1935. This section published recipes, housecleaning tips, and so on (*Nuestra Raza* May 1935). This *feminine* activity was likely welcomed in an attempt to recreate traditional structures of masculinity and femininity within the black race – the "ideal" black woman - something quite common in many accounts of black social life in the U.S. as well (Giddings 1984; White 1999). However, the primarily social, cultural nature of black women's organizing does not mean it did not play an important role in the creation of a black consciousness. Lewis affirms that the primary weapon of resistance in the afro-Uruguayan community was poetry and other cultural outlets, due to a historic lack of a sense of community among phenotypically colored people; a sense that all of the various

newspapers, magazines, journals, cultural societies, and political endeavors have never been able to overcome (Lewis 2003; Merino 1982; *Nuestra Raza* 10 March 1917)[37]. This likely explains why the PAN only receive 87 votes in its first and only political run in the 1938 elections. Lewis observes

> The failure of these publications also points to the historic difficulty of constructing a black identity in Uruguay. In spite of their adverse social and economic status, Afro-Uruguayans still clung to the hope of being perceived as Uruguayan, period, in spite of the fact that they were looked upon as black first and Uruguayan second. Consequently, they learned very little from history or from the attitudes toward racism and discrimination articulated years before in La Conservacion and constantly reiterated in the black press (Lewis 2003, 33).

It appears that the centralist, universalist mission of the Uruguayan nation-state had impacted afro-Uruguayans as well, even as they formed its least important members.

3. Popular Class Women: The Backbone of Uruguay

If black women, and black people in general, were the least important members of Uruguay's modernizing mission, the women and men of the popular class were the most important. Popular class women shared an especially important relationship with the *Batllista* state, particularly as the primary subjects of its paternalist and protectionist policies. *Batllismo* has been noted for its paternal attitude regarding women of the popular class, expressed most frequently in the form of protective labor laws for women. Special laws regulated maternity and maternity leave, the welfare of mothers and children, and special social security laws for women (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza suggest

> One of the more apparent goals of the State was protection of maternity by way of a series of measures (the Code of the Child, Maternity Leave, Family Assignations) materializing the preoccupation to elevate the quality of life of the popular sectors; the woman was understood within a global policy inclined to regularize and strengthen the family as a social cell (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984, 57-58).

These measures appeared as early as 1911 in the form of two months paid maternity leave for teachers that was later extended to public employees; a 1914 law that established that women and children could not be employed in the cleaning or reparation of machines or other agents of dangerous transmission; a 1915 law that created a Maternity House to help future mothers and their children; the 1918 "law of chairs" which established that all establishments where women work have a sufficient number of seats for female employees such that each could take a seat if the work permitted; and a 1920 law that imposed an obligatory weekly rest for all workers, with absolutely no exceptions permitted for women and children, even domestic servants (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984, 92-93).

If the *Batllistas* had gotten their way, these protectionist policies would have gone even further. The *Batllismo* Program of 1922, approved during the Colorado Party's convention, attempted to: reduce the female workday from 8 hours to 6; declare that a mother was allowed and deserved the goods of the Republic, regardless of her civil state; prohibit the woman from working the 30 days preceding and following childbirth; and create asylums to shelter and assist women in the last 30 days of pregnancy and 30 days following birth, or longer if her health required it (Canova and Almeida 1998). During this time she would also be instructed on how to

[37] Nonetheless of all of the major afro-Uruguayan poets who wrote at this time only one, Virginia Brindis de Salas is an afro-Uruguayan woman (Lewis 2003).

raise the child, no doubt by middle-class female professionals. The program also attempted to: establish cradle rooms in establishments where breast-feeding women were employed; and assign 10 pesos monthly for the year beginning prior to the month of delivery, assignation of which would be supplied with pension fund (*El Día*, 5 October 1925). There was a fierce opposition, especially among employers, to much of this program and only a small portion of it was initially ratified. However, over the years many of these measures were enacted by the government, either through direct legislation or through the use of state subsidies to private charitable organizations that could provide some of these services.

The scope of the paternalist *Batllista* state regarding women and children of the popular class was immense. The policies noted above highlight the real mission of the *Batllista* legislators to create a sense of integration, of *uruguayity*, among the members of the popular class by providing for their social needs, in many cases, before they anticipated it themselves. Some policies were geared more towards men, such as the passage of universal male suffrage in 1917, or more gender neutral in their impact, such as the and the creation of worker's compensation and a pension system in 1914 and 1919 (Pendle 1952). But the state constructed those specifically female policies with a specific image in mind; that of the "ideal" woman as social reproducer. The early women of the mass, popular class did not quite qualify as "ideal" women, a status limited to women of the middle- and professional classes (Ehrick 2005; Turenne 1932). But within as little as one generation they could be or, more likely, their daughters could be, given a little help from the state to promote their health and well-being (Turenne 1932). Hence, the first- (and sometimes second-) generation immigrant of the popular classes was the last stepping stone in the evolution of the Uruguayan nation and its shift from barbarism to civilization, from primitivism and backwardness to modernization. Women like the Luisi sisters are some of the best examples of this. The daughters of first-generation immigrant parents from Poland and Italy went on to become a lawyer (Clotilde), a physician (Inés), a well-known poet (Luisa), and the most famous sister, Paulina, a doctor and later an Uruguayan diplomat (Ehrick 2005). These women, and others like them, were the public face of the Uruguayan national mission.

There was another reason that the *Batllista* state was so keen on establishing protective legislation for the members of the working classes.[38] Its successful ability to predict the demands of the working classes gave it the upper hand as an anticipatory state that would preempt much organizing on the ground (Canel 1992). The *Batllista* state and its accompanying social reform programs, known collectively as *el escudo de los débiles* (the shield of the weak), was successful in anticipating the emergence of civil society and of a vocal, middle-class, rather than responding to it (Ehrick 2005). Once established, this relationship has continued into the current day. Hence, the rationale for widespread perceptions of a weak civil society that remains mostly dependent on the Uruguayan government, and particularly the Uruguayan party system, in routing the majority of its demands and activities (Canel 1992; Perelli and Rial 1992).

Due in part to these government efforts, women of the popular classes were not especially prone to organizing for themselves, although there were a few important exceptions. The most successful organizing effort among popular class women was the Telephone Worker's Strike of 1918. At this time, the all-female worker core at the "La Uruguaya" telephone company began to protest their low wages and long working hours. The strike was initially quelled as a result of negotiations between the state and the telephone workers, and with the

[38] In this instance my reference to members of the working classes is meant to refer to *any* classes whose members work, specifically the popular *and* middle-classes

special intervention of Paulina Luisi and Conamu ((Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1988). But the resolution was short-lived and the female telephone workers struck again in 1919. This strike was much longer and more violent; it eventually required the intervention of the national government before the strike could end. By the time that it did, the telephone workers walked away with 10 pesos more per month than they originally demanded (Ehrick 2005).

The first round of the telephone workers strike highlighted the asymmetric relationship between the popular class telephone workers and the middle-class women of Conamu who helped them. The uneven relationship between the two groups is credited to middle-class arrogance. "Because of their particular place in the state (and class) structure, many of these women still viewed poor women as clients, students, and patients, but rarely as partners colleagues, sisters, or equals" (Ehrick 2005, 122). The personal communications of some Conamu members who reference the first telephone worker's strike attempt reflect this attitude. A 1919 letter from Fanny Carrió de Pollera to Paulina Luisi described Conamu's displeasure with the telephone worker's behavior "Dra. [Isabel Pinto] de Vidal did some great work for the telefonistas [female telephone workers], keeping them from having to go on strike, and as usual.....they did not even thank her. Some women deserve the beatings they get" (Ehrick 2005, 151).[39] In sum, popular women were portrayed as apathetic, apolitical, and unappreciative of the work that middle-class women had done on their behalf

The Socialist and Communist Parties also took an interest in promoting the rights of working-class women; the Socialists would advocate for female suffrage as early as 1907, even before becoming a political party (Lavrin 1995).[40] However, Socialist and Communist Party attitudes toward popular-class women were, in some ways, quite similar to that of elite and middle-class feminists. They felt that they needed to "help" the working-class woman who could not necessarily help herself, by promoting her interests in the public sphere (Ehrick 2005). These were the attitudes of "pro-women" cadres within the Socialist and Communist Parties. There was also an "anti-woman" component that felt that the woman needed to be neutralized. This group noted "Women are like peasants, and as such cannot be fully incorporated into the party, but need to 'neutralized,' lest they pose an active impediment to party organizing and the establishment of a communist society" (Ehrick 2005, 191). This attitude is quite representative of a common strain of thought within the Socialist and Communist Parties. Women were considered an impediment to the larger goals of the movement, which was focused primarily on strong labor laws and a good wage for the male worker, who could then take care of his family (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). Female workers inhibited this drive, because they drove wages down and required so much protective legislation that they shifted attention away from the worker's "true" needs and foiled the progress of the movement (Sapriza 1985).
"Pro-women" forces did see the importance of getting the worker woman involved in labor struggles, and decried what they perceived as her lack of interest in organizing. Socialist and Communist Party members voiced a consistent disappointment in popular women's lack of activism, which they assumed to be based on her disinterest (Ehrick 2005). Various attempts to integrate the woman were made, including appeals to her motherly instincts and short-lived clubs, like the Union of Servants, Maids and Affiliates (Ehrick 2005). But, the activities were

[39] Fanny Carrió de Pollera, was a Liberal feminist and a member of Conamu. Isabel Pinto de Vidal was also a Liberal Feminist, a lawyer, and a member of Conamu.
[40] The Socialist Party was founded in 1910. The Communist Party was founded in 1921. The majority of the members of the Socialist Party voted in favor of affiliation with the Third International and converted to the Communist Party, with the result that the Socialist Party was essentially dissolved (Ehrick 2005, 189).

always short-lived, and Party members became hostile to women and chastised them for the lack of participation. What never accompanied these attempts at organization was an attempt to understand why working women were not active; the structural demands that kept them from organizing. Instead hostility towards working women's perceived apathy continued, and by 1924 interest in the "woman question" had faded into the background (Lavrin 1995).

V. Denouement

Public sentiment by the late 1920s assumed that the passage of women's suffrage was inevitable. At this time activity picked up from a broad spectrum of women's groups, particularly Conamu and the Alianza, who established a joint campaign committee in 1930, and started a spate of pro-suffrage activities, including a petition drive that collected 4,000 signatures, which they submitted to parliament (Lavrin 1995). A number of politicians who had previously opposed women's suffrage came out in favor of it, including members of the more conservative, National Party. Even those with strong ties to the Catholic Church had come to support the women's vote. Finally in December of 1932 the law passed both houses and women's suffrage was secured. Ehrick (2005) argues that the passage of women's suffrage should be understood as a combination of the efforts of the women's movement and political pressures. In each case the backers hoped to gain what would come to be perceived as a crucial women's vote in the face of the political uncertainty that characterized the country in the first two years of the 1930s. Political and constitutional changes were brewing and both *Batllista* and conservative forces wanted to gain women's support to help them secure their places in the upcoming political elections. In an effort to put off a rising conservative impulse and political crisis in the country, *Batllista* legislators began what they termed the "second reformist impulse," meant to strengthen the state; approval of the women's vote was the last of those measures (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). But, the conservatives were the victors in this case. The day that suffrage legislation passed both houses an article appeared in the newspaper *El Pueblo*, asking women for their support in a pseudo-feminist party that would eventually be asked to support the coup d' etat that occurred on March 31, 1933 (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). Ironically, this pseudo-feminist party had more women's support than the real feminist party, the Women's Independent Democratic Party. The Feminist Party, as it was better known, was founded in January of 1933 but, due to the coup that followed, it was not allowed to run a candidate until the 1938 elections. While the Feminist Party fared better than the PAN, it achieved far from a resounding victory, with a mere 139 votes in its first and only election run (Ehrick 2005).

It is frequently the case that the passage of suffrage coincides with a denouement in the women's movement, often leading to decades long lulls in women's organizing (Banaszak 1996, Lerner 1979). This was particularly true in Uruguay, where many felt that the "woman" question had been resolved with the passage of suffrage (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1988). This was so much the case that the majority of women's groups disbanded by the late 1930s or early 1940s (Sapriza n.d.). It appears that the *Batllista* goal to coop civil society by beating it to the punch worked. Women's activism waned so much that a small cadre of members of parliament, working entirely of their own accord and without help from women's groups, introduced and secured the passage of the Law on Women's Civil Rights in 1946, which finally granted women full equal civil capacity (Rodríguez Villamil and Sapriza 1984). The lull in organized women's activity continued well into the 1960s and 70s, when liberal and conservative women organized in the face of the democratic instability that occurred in Uruguay during those years. This

widespread women's organizing led to the second wave of the women's movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Conclusion

This paper sought to trace the historical evolution of identity construction of raced and gendered groups of Uruguayan women. National identity construction in post-independence Uruguay affected distinct groups of women in different ways, marginalizing or extolling them based on the degree to which they met or matched the dominant perspective of the ideal woman at different points in time. It is clear that women's differential identity construction set the stage for distinct approaches to mobilization in the first part of the twentieth century. What remains to be seen is the degree to which a differential identity construction matters in the contemporary era, specifically the relationship between identity construction and identity deployment, that is the subject of the larger project.

Appendix A: Population Statistics

Table 1. Early Nineteenth-Century Afro-Uruguayan Population

1810	1819	1829
36%	25%	15%

Source: *Encuentro de entidades negras del Cono Sur*. Organazaciones Mundo Afro, 1990.

Table 2. Population Statistics: Cabildo of Montevideo

		Race of Persons			
	TOTAL	White	Black	Indigenous	Unspecified
1778	4,280	2,903	1,304	73	0
	%	**67.8**	**30.5**	**2.0**	
1803	4,676	3,033	1,040	--------	603
	%	**64.8**	**22.2**		**12.9**

Source: Cabildo of Montevideo statistics cited in Pereda Valdes 1943.
Note: Native Uruguayans were generally nomads, and thus would not have been numerous within the urban confines of Montevideo. Indigenous estimates outside of Montevideo vary from 600 to 3000 (Antón 1994)

Table 3: Population Statistics: Archivo Histórico Nacional

	TOTAL	White	Black	Indigenous	Unspecified
1781	10,223	7,272	2,653	228	70
	%	**71.1**	**26.0**	**2.2**	**.007**

Source: Archivo Histórico Nacional cited in Pereda Valdes 1943
Note: Native Uruguayans were generally nomads, and thus would not have been numerous within the urban confines of Montevideo. Indigenous estimates outside of Montevideo vary from 600 to 3000 (Antón 1994)

Table 4. Black Population Breakdown

	TOTAL	Free	Slave	Unspecified
1778	1304	535	700	69
	%	**41.0**	**53.7**	**5.3**
1781	2653	1186	1467	0
	%	**44.7**	**55.3**	**0**
1803	1040	141	899	0
	%	**13.6**	**86.4**	

Sources: Cabildo of Montevideo and Archivo Histórico Nacional cited in Pereda Valdes 1943

Table 7. Population Statistics and European Immigration

	TOTAL	Immigrant	Unspecified
1835	128,371	25,000	4,880
	%	**19.5**	**3.8**
1852	131,969	28, 586	35,845
	%	**21.6**	**27.2**
1860	223, 238	41, 217	832
	%	**18.5**	**.004**
1900	915, 647	149,757	------
	%	**16.4**	
1908	1,042,686	133,255	------
	%	**12.8**	

Source: Apuntes Estadísticios del Dr. Andrés Lamas, cited in Arteagra and Puiggrós 1990 and Narancio and Capurro 1939.
Note: Dr. Andrés Lamas was not a statistician but the chief of police of Montevideo. Most scholars doubt his numbers, but they are all that are available (See Narancia and Capurro 1939 and Rial Roade 1983 for more discussion of this topic).

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