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
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**Masculinity as Practice and Representation /
La masculinité: réalités et représentations**

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The rise of women's history during the past three decades has led to major innovations in the writing of history. The uncovering of forgotten and repressed histories, the development of new means of analysing historical processes centred around the category of 'gender', and the formulation of fundamental critiques of the epistemological assumptions of historiography all represent the fruits of research efforts made during these years. This session presents work in one of the most recent fields of inquiry that have opened up in the course of this process of historiographical innovation: the historicisation of masculinity.¹ The seven papers presented here aim, in various ways, to provide deeply historicised accounts of the representations and practices of masculinity in the history of politics, the military and war in the long nineteenth and the twentieth century. This is a field in which the introduction of a gender perspective focusing on masculinity might prove most provocative and stimulating for empirical and theoretical discussion.

The study of masculinity as a historical phenomenon is largely an outgrowth of the introduction of 'gender' as a category of historical analysis.² Not only has the development of the concept of gender helped to shift the focus from 'women' to socially and culturally constructed notions of sexual difference, it has also facilitated the analysis of men and masculinity as profoundly historical phenomena. By defining sexual difference as socially and culturally constructed, the concept of gender has allowed scholars to make men and masculinity legitimate objects of historical analysis – a status historians long managed to avoid by taking refuge in the seemingly timeless universals of 'Man' and 'Mankind'. The historical study of masculinity is an innovation that has resulted from the development of gender history out of women's history. This does not imply, however, that women's history or gender history have therefore been superseded. The perspectives they have brought to the fore are of crucial importance to the development of this new line of inquiry. This session intends to place the history of masculinity squarely within the field of gender history. It seeks to apply theories and methods developed in gender history to the analysis of masculinity, while at the same time reflecting critically on the extent to which the history of masculinity requires a special theoretical and/or methodological apparatus and focus within gender history.

Thus while the history of masculinity can fruitfully build on insights produced by gender history, it also explores the limitations of earlier work. Women's and gender history have long devoted relatively little attention to politics, the military and war.³ This may be attributed not least to a conscious process of distancing from the political and military history that have domi-

nated traditional historiography, as well as the corresponding periodisation, which follows great political and military events such as revolutions and wars. Where women's historians have addressed such areas, it was generally from the standpoint of women's exclusion or inclusion. The opening up of gender history for questions of men and masculinities, not only increased the interest in reworking these classic topics from a gender perspective, but changed the perspective as well. These fields have been reconceptualised as the seemingly 'natural' homelands of masculinity, i.e., scholars now analyse the historical process in which politics, the military and war came to be constructed as 'naturally' masculine realms and ask which notions of both – of masculinity, and of politics, the military and war – result from this. How current frameworks in gender history will be able to accommodate these new conceptualisations of seemingly familiar fields, or whether they will require us to rethink aspects of gender history remains to be seen.

The potential need to rethink current assumptions of gender history notwithstanding, the history of masculinity has the advantage of being able to draw on the analytical apparatus of gender history. One aspect of this, which is of special importance for a radical historicisation of masculinity, is the awareness that notions of sexual difference are constructed in historically variable and specific contexts, and that the meaning and 'truth' of these notions depend strictly on the epistemological and socio-political nature of these contexts. To those historians familiar with gender history this may seem something of a truism. In dealing with a category like masculinity, however, which so easily assumes an air of timelessness, this awareness of the supreme importance of context acquires renewed relevance.

The history of masculinity could also profit from the insight provided by gender history that constructions of masculinity and femininity are relational, and thus cannot be studied in isolation. To understand their meaning(s), specific constructions of masculinity must be analysed in relation to constructions of femininity, other constructions of masculinity, and effeminacy (*effeminate / efféminé / weibisch*). Constructions of effeminacy are especially relevant, for they point to the hierarchical nature of the relations that constitute masculinity. And these relations do more than simply produce hierarchy. They also help to draw boundaries between, for instance, national selves and others. Whereas the feminine can be included in the national self – albeit mostly in a subordinate position – effeminacy is usually placed beyond the line separating self and other and actually helps to create that boundary. Furthermore constructions of masculinity must also be placed in a field of categories of difference such as age, class, ethnicity, marital status, nationality, religion and sexual identity. Only by analysing the nature of these relations and their historically changing configurations we can fully comprehend the meanings of masculinity.

A third significant insight for a session that focuses on masculinity in politics, the military and war is that the socially and culturally constructed notions of masculinity and femininity referred to by the term gender do not simply allude to men and women. They are also used to create

[gendered] meanings for social and political life 'in general'. These meanings tend to inscribe the social and political reality they signify with asymmetry and hierarchy. This fact makes gender a politically contested form of knowledge that is of central importance to the signification and articulation of relationships of power. The recurrent representation of the national self as masculine and of 'other' nations as effeminate is one example of the intricate work of gender in signifying power relations in politics and war. It is only one example of the many ways in which other differences – age, class etc. – are partly produced through gender, and of their inscription with asymmetry and hierarchy. It is an example that is highly relevant to this theme. The construction of gendered selves and others is part and parcel of the construction of 'the enemy'. As such it is absolutely instrumental to the mass military mobilisations that appeared in the period of national wars under discussion in this session.

An overly literal identification of constructions of gender with 'actually existing men and women' is rendered additionally problematic by gender history's careful analyses of the production of gendered subjectivities. Rather than assuming a simple and total fit between gender identity and ideology, gender history has developed complex accounts of the relationship of subjects to discourses of gender. This is the fourth area where the history of masculinity can fruitfully build on gender history.

Finally, historians of masculinity can draw inspiration from one of the major ambitions of gender history, i.e., the desire to rewrite dominant accounts of history. Historians of gender have often been driven by the ambition to explore the changes that might be produced in established and dominant historical narratives by a systematic focus on the importance of gender in the histories these narratives claim to recount. This is a major challenge for the history of masculinity as well, and all the more so for the histories of politics and war. Here masculinity is very much present but at the same time, in a sense, invisible since it has never been explicitly analysed. Thus we have chosen to focus on the history of masculinity in politics, the military and war in the long nineteenth and the twentieth century. In this period modern notions of gender difference(s) were constructed and consolidated, while at the same time modern ideas and practices of war and politics were developed and implemented. The session seeks to analyse among other things the intersection of these two developments. Important topics in this respect are, for example, the introduction of general conscription and inclusive male citizenship; we ask how these modernisations in war and politics were connected to the development of modern notions of gender difference, how they reflected and shaped emerging notions of masculinity, and how notions of masculinity produced the gendered conceptions and practices of citizenship and conscription. It may well be at this intersection that we can find the keys to writing new narratives of politics, the military and war.

We will organise our following discussion of the papers around these five insights provided by gender history. Each section will present the papers against the background of recent work in gender history and the history of

masculinity. Each section closes with issues raised by the papers which might be pursued further.

I. Historicising Masculinity: Constructs and Contexts

Perhaps the most radical historicisation of masculinity [and of femininity] yet has been produced by historians of the body such as Claudia Honegger, Thomas Laqueur, and Londa Schiebinger.⁴ They have all, in different ways, argued that the modern, gendered body is a relatively recent invention of Western history. It was only around 1800 that the notion of sexual difference as located primarily in the body, and of male and female bodies as fundamental opposites, became part of the Western understanding of the body and of sexual difference. For all of these authors the rise of notions of sexual difference as an opposition firmly enshrined in the body is an eminently political story. They locate the invention of this idea of sexual difference in the context of the emergence of political discourses of equality – discourses that resulted in the re-allocation of inequality in biology and the body. Moreover, they stress the unstable nature of this modern notion of embodied sexual difference. It rendered invisible historically available discourses of sexual difference that had presented the relationship between male and female bodies as a continuum or an analogy rather than as an irreconcilable difference. These discourses, however, could never be totally effaced and would continue to haunt the modern gendered body.⁵

In her paper 'The Republican Gentleman: Ideological Conflict / Subjective Uncertainty in the Anglo-American Past' Carroll Smith-Rosenberg also explores the effects of the political changes in the years around 1800 on modern constructions of gender. She, too, finds fundamental instabilities at the heart of modernity's concepts of gender. But where historians of the body have focused on the constructions of the gendered body – and their instabilities – that were produced in the context of political change, Smith-Rosenberg explores the political discourse themselves, revealing the subjective instabilities produced by the contradictions within these discourses. In a paper that covers both eighteenth-century England and the United States in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Smith-Rosenberg recounts the adventures of the masculine, virtuous citizen of classical republicanism. This brave and virile *zoon politikon*, who lived to serve the common good of his country, already had to face serious challenges in eighteenth-century England. His austerity, the autonomy of his judgement, which was grounded in his solid economic independence, his valour and willingness to do battle had to give way when, with the rise of fiscal capitalism and commercial society, the figures of the venture capitalist and 'the gentlemen of refinement and fashionable possessions' entered the scene. They seemed to fare far better in the modern world than the citizen of classical republicanism did.

In England these ideological conflicts were to some extent resolved in the new creed of liberalism. Liberalism replaced republican virtue with sentiments and feelings as means of social bonding and cohesion. It foregrounded

an essentially private, property-owning man foreign to classical republicanism, while at the same time endowing him with qualities that safeguarded society's cohesion. In the newly created United States of America these ideological tensions were to remain very much alive. In this post-colonial nation EuroAmericans embraced both classical republicanism *and* the culture of gentility and consumerism. In an attempt to fashion themselves as both the true, uncorrupted heirs of classical republicanism, and as white Americans who were as cultured and refined as Europeans, EuroAmericans fully reproduced the ideological tension between republican virtue and commercial refinement. 'Here, then, is where we find ideological confusions escalating, subjectivities decentering and fragmenting.' One of the 'products' of these ideological confusions and subjective uncertainties, Smith-Rosenberg writes, was scientific racism. In an attempt to convince Europeans that they were civilised and cultured, EuroAmericans embraced racism in order to distinguish themselves from the 'savages' with whom they shared the West. Together with the face of the capitalist and that of the genteel and feeling man, the face of the white racist constituted an 'internally contradictory and inherently unstable national identity'.⁶

Smith-Rosenberg studies the masculine subject of classical republicanism – and his adversaries – in the multiple historical contexts of two nations and the various revolutionary socio-economic and political changes they underwent. In so doing she provides us with an exemplary exercise in exposing the variability of constructions of masculinity and their instabilities. She also explores a theme in modern masculinity that reappears in various papers in this session. Several authors discuss the ensemble of masculinity, virtue, citizenship, and the valorous willingness and obligation to fight for the nation. They, too, explore the meanings of and tensions in this ensemble in various contexts. Unstable and contested as he was, the virtuous citizen of classical republicanism continued to provide a model for constructions of masculinity in politics and war throughout the long nineteenth century. Furthermore, the above-mentioned ensemble of masculine political and military qualities reappears in political discourses and practices that are decidedly non-republican. In the experiments with liberal mass democracy during the age of revolution this ensemble was very much visible in the recurring connection of political rights with military duties. In the politics during their struggle against Napoleon and in the period of restoration that followed his downfall, the European monarchies reasserted their power through a patriotic-national military mobilisation that relied on a discourse of patriotism and valorousness that resembled this republican discourse. They, too, tied the promise of (more) citizenship rights for men to the duty of (universal) conscription, at least when the 'fatherland' was in peril. We must analyse these discourses and practices in their various political and military contexts. Only then can we begin to understand the various meanings and functions of the amalgam of masculine political and military qualities that is such a prominent aspect of political culture in the long nineteenth and the twentieth century.

By focusing on classical republicanism as a major site for studying constructions of modern masculinity, Smith-Rosenberg's paper makes an interesting (implicit) comment on existing studies of gender and politics in the modern era. Like the above-mentioned histories of the body, these have often centered on the rise of political discourses of equality, and more specifically of liberalism, in an attempt to account for the paradoxical relation of women's rights to the modern political culture of equality.⁷ These studies have asked to what extent liberal notions of equality and inclusion are in fact underpinned by implicit gender exclusions and inequalities that explain the persistent political exclusion of women from liberal democracy. Perhaps Smith-Rosenberg's paper indicates the necessity of foregrounding classical republicanism in its different variations and relating it both to its antagonists and to liberalism and nationalism in a political history of gender that fully comprises masculinity. In order to move beyond an exclusive focus on classical republicanism, one could also argue for a further analysis of the ensemble of masculinity and political and military patriotic-national virtues referred to earlier. This virtually all-pervasive discourse reappeared in various contexts and incarnations, and thus should be a major element in the history of gender in national political culture.⁸

II. Conceptualising Masculinity: Hegemonic Masculinity and its Others

There are currently two influential and interrelated ways of conceptualising masculinity as relational. Building on linguistics and the philosophy of deconstruction, authors like Eve K. Sedgwick have analysed masculinity as constituted in relation to 'other(s)', i.e., as a category that derives its meaning from a negation of that which it purports not to be but nevertheless constantly needs to reinvoké – if only to deny it – in order to acquire meaning at all.⁹ Taking elements from this conceptualisation and reinterpreting them in a more sociological vein, Robert W. Connell has coined the term 'hegemonic masculinity' to refer to specific forms of masculinity that are 'culturally exalted' over others at a given time. Connected to other forms of masculinity through relations of subordination, marginalisation and complicity, hegemonic masculinity is 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women.'¹⁰ Connell stresses that hegemonic and other masculinities are not 'fixed character types' but parts of a changing structure of relationships. Hegemonic masculinity should be understood as a temporary core of a constantly changing field of relations: it is always contestable. It is not accepted as hegemonic by all men in a given society, neither is its hegemony secured by direct violence; it depends on a successful, if contestable, claim to authority. For male subjectivity this means that it is not necessarily determined by hegemonic masculinity and its 'others'. The contest around hegemonic masculinity creates a space in which subjectivities can be negotiated rather than imposed.

Jacobus A. du Pisani makes fruitful use of Connell's concept in his paper on 'Mythmaking and Hegemonic Masculinity in Afrikaner Nationalist Mobilisation' in South Africa during the years 1934-1948, a period in which nationalist 'Afrikanerdom' rose to power. The paper combines an analysis of continuities and changes in the hegemonic form of Afrikaner masculinity with an exposition of the 'others' that helped cement it. Produced as much by a frontier tradition as by Calvinism, Afrikaner masculinity was characterised by individualism, conservatism and patriarchal authority. In the pre-industrial age 'the Boer patriarch was master on his own farm and independence characterised Afrikaner masculinity.' This Afrikaner hegemonic masculinity succeeded in incorporating modern urban elements into a rural original, thus helping to maintain and widen its appeal in an urbanising society. At the same time this 'sophisticated' and urbanised masculinity was still firmly wedded to a masculinity of heroism and valour of republican ancestry. This – heterogeneous – construction acquired further meaning in contrast to a set of 'others' in which the British 'imperialist Jingo', the 'capitalist Jew', and the 'uncivilised Black' figured prominently.

The dense web of relations in which Du Pisani embeds Afrikaner hegemonic masculinity testifies to the deeply relational nature of masculinity. At the same time the wealth and diversity of the – historically changing – relations Du Pisani invokes in order to mark out hegemonic Afrikaner masculinity raise the question of the extent to which hegemonic masculinity is characterised by stability and dominance. Du Pisani himself points to something like this when he states that 'a single type of masculinity, universally accepted by all Afrikaner men, does not and has never existed.' Du Pisani's paper seems to offer a perfect starting point for a discussion of the merits of conceptualising masculinity using the notion of hegemonic masculinity. His work, as well as other papers in this session, points to the embeddedness of masculinity in profoundly diverse and changing fields of relations. It raises the question of what concepts might best capture the meaning(s) of masculinity in the unstable fields of relations that historical research has begun to uncover.

In her paper 'Temperate Heroes: Masculinity in Second World War Britain' Sonya O. Rose examines hegemonic masculinity as it was produced in British public discourse during the war years 1939-1945. Central to her analysis of the masculinity depicted in newspaper articles, advertisements, propaganda posters and other representations are the disparate characteristics from which it was fashioned. Her paper suggests that in wartime Britain crucial aspects of post-World War I 'anti-heroic' masculinity were 'combined with seemingly antithetical heroic ones most clearly exemplified by combat soldiers.' After the First World War a masculinity characterised by love of home, emotional reserve, and 'good cheer' replaced the ostentatiously heroic and belligerent masculinity typical of the pre-war period.¹¹ During World War II elements of this anti-heroic masculinity were combined with elements of a masculinity exemplified by the soldier-hero, producing a 'temperate masculinity'. This temperate masculinity was equated with Britishness/

Englishness and with good citizenship in general. The 'other' of this equation of masculinity and national identity was the hyper-masculinity of Nazism. In her analysis of hegemonic 'temperate masculinity' Rose points to the fact that this 'masculinity was formed in relation to femininity, and ... to other masculinities with predominating characteristics whose fusion had different valences.' Of special interest in her untangling of the web of relations that helped constitute 'temperate masculinity' are the divergent roles of effeminacy and femininity in fashioning hegemonic masculinity.

Rose argues that the Conscientious Objector posed a challenge to wartime hegemonic masculinity – a challenge that was met with imputations of effeminacy that amounted to barely veiled accusations of homosexuality. The fact that Rose finds the opposition of masculinity and effeminacy in the context of wartime Britain testifies to the longevity of this opposition. Recent work on the history of masculinity has shown the central importance of effeminacy to eighteenth-century constructions of masculinity.¹² Rose's paper – and other papers in this session – makes it clear that effeminacy remained an important 'other' of masculinity throughout the long nineteenth and twentieth century. This suggests that masculinity, despite acquiring a seemingly unshakeable foundation in biology and the body in this period, remained a precarious construct. Moreover, it suggests the continuous importance of constructions of gender that competed with the modern binary opposition of masculinity and femininity.

Although effeminacy appears as an important 'other' of masculinity in various papers, its otherness is mediated through various differentiations in different contexts. In wartime Britain effeminacy was nearly coterminous with homosexuality. Thomas Welskopp shows in his paper 'The Political Man: The Construction of Masculinity in German Social Democracy, 1848-1878' that in the political culture of mid-nineteenth century Germany social democratic men equated effeminacy with a lack of steadfastness in political principles. It denoted a reprehensible and calculating willingness to compromise that characterised the liberal bourgeoisie and was unworthy of the manly Social Democrat. In his paper 'Manly Moderation: Masculinity and the Invention of a Dutch Political Tradition' Stefan Dudink identifies effeminacy as part of a late eighteenth-century republican political discourse that Dutch Patriots used in their struggle with a near autocratic political regime. Here, effeminacy was the product of wealth and luxury, and threatened to undermine the nation's ability to maintain its liberty. These different meanings of effeminacy point to the importance of a historical conceptualisation of masculinity that takes into account other differentiations than gender, and that does not equate gender with the modern opposition of femininity and masculinity.

Rose's paper offers some intriguing insights on the role of femininity in constructions of masculinity. She states that the 'temperate masculinity' of wartime Britain was constructed in opposition to femininity but at the same time 'absorb(ed) and claim(ed) for masculinity those characteristics and behaviours previously associated with women.' Rose argues that masculinity

and femininity are not always symmetrically opposed to one another. Whereas women assuming masculine characteristics often seem to put their femininity in jeopardy, certain men can – under certain circumstances – 'adopt the feminine as their own', retain their masculinity, and derive power from the femininity they have appropriated. The asymmetrical relationship between masculinity and femininity is then directly translated into inequalities of power. This is an insight that deserves further exploration. Especially important in this respect are the questions of, first, what historical notions of gender allow for this bending of masculinity and second, under what circumstances this might occur. As Rose's paper suggests, one of the circumstances that seem to facilitate such a politics of masculinity/femininity is, paradoxically, war.

The destabilising effect of war on gender relations is of course a theme that has been well researched. This work mainly focuses on the temporary broadening of the range of activities and behaviours deemed appropriate for women – and the unease about, and policing of, women's behaviour that this provoked. The period following war is often characterised by a rigid re-inscription of gender roles and expectations.¹³ Rose's paper points to the possibility that war might also, in some contexts, result in an expansion of notions of masculinity (to the point where they start to include aspect of femininity). An expansion, moreover, that does not result in gender panic, but rather helps to create and maintain national unity.

III. Analysing Power Relations: The Politics of Masculinity

Gender history has had a major impact on the field of political history. One reason is gender history's emphasis on the symbolic importance of notions of femininity and masculinity in social and political fields and power struggles that seem to be unrelated, or only indirectly related, to the socio-political relations between the sexes. In pointing to this role of gender in the signification and articulation of relationships of power, gender history opens new lines of inquiry in political history.

The history not just of politics, but also of 'gender itself' has been profoundly affected by this new approach. In helping to construct additional categories of difference, gender plays a part in other socio-political relations and struggles than those between the sexes. This insight has resulted not only in a multiplication of the fields of historical study in which gender might be relevant, but also in a more radical problematisation of masculinity and femininity themselves. As Mrinalini Sinha recently pointed out in an essay on the history of masculinity, this approach 'entails a dislodging of masculinity from its privileged grounding in (the biologically sexed bodies of) 'real men'.' Masculinity, in her analysis, 'acquires its meaning only in specific practices: it has no *à priori* context or origin.'¹⁴

One important aspect of masculinity's power in politics, which is discussed in several papers, is the way it lends itself to political attempts at creating and maintaining (national) unity. It is especially in gendered notions of

patriotism that this aspect of masculinity's political power seems to constantly reappear – and it is subject to constant appropriations and re-interpretations. Sonya Rose discusses a British 'temperate masculinity' that was equated with good citizenship and with national identity more generally during World War II. Jacobus A. du Pisani finds a near total equation of Afrikaner national identity with a construction of Afrikaner masculinity. Stefan Dudink analyses the construction of a unity of the national past, present, and future in early nineteenth-century Holland through the invocation of imagined male bonds of kinship. In all of these instances diverging constructions of masculinity perform political tasks in military and political struggles that cannot be wholly subsumed under struggles between men and women. None of these authors is likely to deny that the use of masculinity in these struggles affected (power) relations between men and women. They do, however, try to avoid equating the struggles articulated through and signified by masculinity with struggles between men and women. They do so in order to fully grasp the symbolical meanings – and their effects – of masculinity.

Two papers in this session seek a delicate balance between masculinity as constructed in/constructing other power relations than those between men and women on the one hand, and an analysis of constructions of masculinity in precisely those relationships on the other. In 'The Masculinity of Political Discourse: The Representation of 'Needs' as 'Rights'' Marilyn Lake discusses constructions of masculinity in the building of the early twentieth-century Australian welfare state. She points to the construction of a specific notion of masculinity and masculine entitlement that figured in struggles both between employers and trade unions and between feminists and their opponents. In response to feminist lobbying for motherhood and childhood endowment, and employers' pressure to lower wages, Australian male trade union representatives and Labour party men invoked political arguments in which men's needs were translated into rights. They argued for a family wage sufficient to secure men's rights to the domestic, companionate and sexual services of women. This, as Lake points out, was an ambivalent construction of masculinity. The appeal to need could easily be interpreted as feminine or childlike. Yet many men felt obliged to express their needs to justify their right to higher wages. Like Sonya Rose in her analysis of the temperate masculinity of wartime Britain, Lake points to masculinity's ability to appropriate elements of femininity. And here too this appropriation serves to create and maintain inequalities of power.

This appeal to masculine entitlement helped to secure political gains on two fronts. It aided in countering feminist proposals for motherhood and child endowment and it employers' attempts to lower wages. In an appeal to the obligation to treat all (white) men equally – regardless of marital or occupational status – Labour and union representatives played the cards of (white) male solidarity and maintaining male privilege. This appeal to a racialised male solidarity proved a powerful move, bringing political victories in the arenas of gender, class, and race, victories highly dependent on masculinity's ability to signify and articulate power relations in multiple arenas of political struggle.

Thomas Welskopp analyses a similar presence of the politics of masculinity in the arenas of both class and gender. He points to the specific nature of Social Democracy in mid-nineteenth century Germany in order to explain the sort of masculinity it constructed and was in its turn constructed by. Not a class movement in the strict sense, but rather a primarily political movement of artisans, small producers, and radical marginal men, it produced a collective political identity for its members. The politically charged sociability that formed the core of this movement was 'the central stage on which Social Democrats could act out their imaginations of a complete personality as embodied in the vision of the political citizen.' This was a decidedly masculine personality, which found its most complete embodiment in the figure of the ferocious political orator. Welskopp's paper foregrounds this political construction of masculinity, while other studies have tended to emphasise that the male breadwinner embodied not just middle-class but also working-class notions of masculinity.¹⁵

The 'rhetorical masculinity' at the heart of Social Democracy was a crucial element in this movement's (class) politics. It was important to the construction of both a collective political identity opposed to the bourgeoisie, the reactionary state, and the church and to the expression of this collective identity in a public sphere of associations, clubs, and gatherings. While this masculinity helped to create an oppositional political identity, it also assumed and actually secured the exclusion of women from the movement's public realm. Women, deemed 'profane elements' in the ostentatiously dignified and respectable public sphere of Social Democracy, were relegated to a marginal position in the movement. The occupation of the public sphere by a masculinity that could assert itself, its honour and dignity only there effectively excluded women. This exclusion proved to be problematic for Social Democrats who tended to present the 'miniature republic' of their associations as blueprints for the socialist future: this blueprint could not accommodate half of the population. One might add that in appropriating the right to public speech, which was the self-evident privilege of the bourgeoisie, Social Democrats reproduced the bourgeois exclusion of women. In terms of gender, social-democratic practices built on bourgeois assumptions as much as it contested them elsewhere.

IV. Including the Subject: Masculinity and Subjectivity

The awareness that constructions of masculinity and femininity signify and articulate various power relations has also influenced historical analyses of gendered subjectivity. It has further strengthened the argument that the relationship between discourses of masculinity and femininity and 'real men and women' is always mediated. It is this room for mediation, negotiation and manoeuvre that has been explored in attempts by gender historians to historicise both discourse and experience, without conceiving of one of these two as determining the other.¹⁶

In 'Re-Remembering the Soldier Hero: The Composure and Re-Composure of Masculinity' Michael Roper explores the space between domi-

nant public narratives of soldiering and subjective needs in the case of Lyndall Urwick (1891-1983). Urwick served as an officer in the British Army during the first World War and went on to become a nationally and internationally renowned pioneer of professional management. Roper makes full use of the letters Urwick wrote home every two or three days during the war, and of his no less than six memoirs of his war experiences. These rich sources allow a critical investigation of the importance of narratives of soldiering in the subjective composure of masculinity. He focuses on the various ways in which Urwick retold certain events that occurred during his service in the trenches of northern France. Roper agrees that the succession of accounts of these events Urwick produced 'shows the significance of soldiering as a culturally vaunted means of narrating a man's life'. He disagrees, however, with those analyses of this compulsion to re-tell experiences of soldiering that overemphasise the importance of post-war gender scripts in structuring war memory. In his analysis of the process of re-remembering Roper foregrounds an ongoing search for ways to deal with the fear of death and dislike of killing that date from the war itself. Drawing on psychoanalysis, he argues that the 'composure' of war memories should be understood 'not only as a process of accommodating (...) public histories, but as a means of dealing with the psychic residues of the event.'

Roper's account of the production of war memories is inspired by psychoanalysis.¹⁷ In his paper 'the room for mediation' we mentioned above is thus inhabited by the unconscious and its ways of dealing with the past. This turn to psychoanalysis is one way of exploring the mediated nature of the relationship between discourses of gender and gendered subjectivities. Apart from psychoanalysis, one might also mention the critical interpretations of discourse analysis that emphasise the importance of the appropriation of discourse 'at the juncture between the world of the text and the world of the subject.'¹⁸ The differences between these approaches are considerable, of course, but both could help to produce cracks and fissures in the compulsive retelling of narratives of masculinity – narratives that never manage perfectly to construct male subjects in their own image.

IV. Rewriting history: Towards a Gendered History of Politics, the Military and War

The introduction of gender as a category of historical analysis came with a call to rewrite history. Historians of gender have underscored the need to reconsider dominant narratives of historical development in the light of the histories produced by a systematic focus on gender. In the field under discussion in this session such rewriting has only just begun. It is clear though that the field of politics, the military and war in the long nineteenth and the twentieth century is a highly promising one for such an endeavour. That this is a gendered field where constructions of masculinity are of supreme importance is as obvious as the fact that it has as yet been relatively unexplored from this perspective. The fact that the great changes in politics, the military and war in

this period seem to have occurred more or less simultaneously with major changes in constructions of gender makes the prospect of rewriting history all the more promising.¹⁹

One such rewriting of existing historical narratives is offered by Stefan Dudink's paper. Dudink discusses nineteenth- and twentieth-century representations of the Dutch political past. These representations have tended to stress the moderate nature of Dutch political life and have characterised Dutch political culture as one of consensus and gradual reform. Dudink points out that this notion of the past partly rests on an 'othering' of a military masculinity. In order to assert the moderate nature of Dutch political life, military masculinity had to be marginalised in representations of the Dutch past. This was especially the case where a military masculinity was associated with radical politics, as in the example of the citizen-soldier who figured prominently in the revolutionary turmoil of late eighteenth-century Dutch politics.

This mode of representing the political past has trouble accommodating the less moderate and peaceful episodes of Dutch history. Dudink discusses one such episode that occurred in the 1830's and was characterised by intense nationalism and martial political rhetoric. This episode is often portrayed as an anomaly in Dutch history. Dudink tries to show that it was not so much an anomaly as a crucial episode for establishing a sense of continuity for the newly created Dutch state. This sense of continuity was created through allusions to bonds of male kinship that represented the Dutch as the true heirs to a great past. These references to male bonds of kinship were a common feature of political language in this period, but served a specific purpose in this context. It was through these imagined bonds of male kinship, Dudink argues, that a sense of continuity was created for a political community that could only then begin to imagine itself as always moderate and peaceful.

Dudink's paper is an attempt to rewrite the dominant historical narrative of one political community through the lens of masculinity. We also need to ask about the purposes of the history of masculinity as well as its relationship to historical narrative on a more abstract level. Lynn Hunt has discussed the tension within gender history between a focus on the historical deconstruction of categories such as 'masculinity' and the objective of rewriting historical (meta)narratives. Hunt argues that gender history should not stop at the deconstruction of categories of gender: 'the disaggregation of categories only gains real force when it is tied to a reconstruction of metanarrative.'²⁰ Hunt does not embrace the construction of one new metanarrative. She argues for 'narrative as a crucial domain of conflict over the meaning of the past and its relationship to the future.'

The construction of a narrative on the intersection between modern notions of masculinity and modern ideas and practices of politics and war might be precisely such a 'domain of conflict'. The conflict over this narrative cannot be limited to its historiographical accuracy. It should, obviously, also be a conflict over dismantling the seemingly self-evident conflation of mas-

culinity with politics, the military and war. Furthermore it might be a fruitful domain of conflict over the hierarchy of historical (meta)narratives themselves. Like other so-called 'specialised' branches of history, gender history has often been regarded as of marginal interest to 'general history'. As Karin Hausen recently pointed out, there is a politics of gender at work within history here. Just as women have traditionally been regarded as peripheral to politics and war, so gender is thought to be of minor interest to political and military history.²⁷

The history of masculinity could help gender history make inroads into 'general history'. After all, it is hard to miss the obvious relevance of constructions of masculinity for these fields. It would be a missed opportunity, however, if such an integration of gender perspectives into 'general history' were not to be accompanied by a contestation of the very idea of 'general history' and the (gendered) hierarchies that it rests upon and reproduces. The history of masculinity has begun to analyse masculinity as a fragile historical construct that is deeply contextual and constructed through/dependent on relations with various other categories. If the history of masculinity succeeds in becoming part of 'general history', it should apply these insights on the constructions of masculinity to an analysis of the construction of general history. In such a manner the history of masculinity could help to expose the fragile, contextual and relational nature of the 'general' in 'general history'.

List of papers for this theme

- Stefan Dudink, the Netherlands: Manly Moderation: Masculinity and the Invention of a Dutch Political Tradition
- Marilyn Lake, Australia: The Masculinity of Political Discourse: The Representation of 'Needs' as 'Rights' in the Forging of the Australian Welfare State
- Jacobus A. du Pisani, South Africa: Mythmaking and Hegemonic Masculinity in Afrikaner Nationalist Mobilisation, 1934-1948
- Michael Roper, Great Britain: Re-Remembering the Soldier Hero: The Composure and Re-Composure of Masculinity in Narratives of the Great War
- Sonya O. Rose, USA: Temperate Heroes: Masculinity in Second World War Britain
- Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, USA: The Republican Gentleman: Ideological Conflict / Subjective Uncertainty in the Anglo-American Past
- Thomas Welskopp, Germany: The Political Man: The Construction of Masculinity in German Social Democracy, 1848-1878

Notes

- 1 For some overviews, see John Tosh, What Should Historians Do With Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth Century Britain, in *History Workshop Journal* 38 [1994], pp. 179-202; Mrinalini Sinha, 'Giving Masculinity a History: Some Contributions from the Historiography of Colonial India,' *Gender & History* 3 [1999], pp. 445-460; John Tosh, 'The Old Adam and the New Man: Emerging Themes in the History of English Masculinities, 1750-1850,' in Tim Hitchcock and Michèle Cohen (eds.), *English Masculinities 1660-1800* (London and New York, 1999), pp. 217-238.
- 2 Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, *American Historical Review* 91 [1986], pp. 1053-75.
- 3 See for instance Margaret Randolph Higonnet et. al. (eds), *Behind the Lines. Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven and London, 1987); T.G. Fraser and Keith Jeffery (eds.), *Men, Women and War* [Dublin, 1993]; Billie Melman (ed.), *Borderlines. Gender and Identities in War and Peace 1870-1930* (New York and London, 1998).
- 4 Claudia Honnegger, *Die Ordnung der Geschlechter. Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen und das Weib* (Frankfurt a.M and New York, 1991); Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge MA, 1990); Londa Schiebinger, *The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science* (Cambridge MA, 1989).
- 5 For a recent study of masculinity that follows this track see Angus McLaren, *The Trials of Masculinity: Policing Sexual Boundaries, 1870-1930* (Chicago, 1997).
- 6 On race, ethnicity and masculinity see: Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity. *The 'manly Englishman' and the 'effeminate Bengali' in the late nineteenth century* (Manchester and New York, 1995); Henry Stecopoulos and Michael Uebel (eds.), *Race and the subject of masculinities* (Durham and London, 1997).
- 7 Joan B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of Revolution* (Ithaca, 1988); Joan W. Scott, *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man* (Cambridge MA, 1996).
- 8 See examples for a gendered history of nationalism in: Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann and Catherine Hall (eds.), *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long 19th Century* (London and New York, 2000).
- 9 Eve K. Sedgwick, *Between Men. English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York, 1985).
- 10 Robert. W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 76-81.

- 11 For a slightly different interpretation of the pre-war period see Joanna Bourke, *Dismembering the Male. Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War* (London, 1996).
- 12 See, for example, Michèle Cohen, *Fashioning Masculinity: National Identity and Language in the Eighteenth Century* (London and New York, 1996).
- 13 See Karen Hagemann, Venus und Mars. Reflexionen zu einer Geschlechtergeschichte von Militär und Krieg, in Karen Hagemann and Ralf Pröve (eds.), *Landsknechte, Soldatenfrauen und Nationalkrieger. Militär, Krieg und Geschlechterordnung im historischen Wandel* (New York and Frankfurt a.M., 1998), pp. 13-48, 24ff.
- 14 Sinha, 'Giving Masculinity a History', p. 454.
- 15 On masculinity and domesticity in the Victorian middle-class see, for example, John Tosh, *A Man's Place: Masculinity and the middle-class home in Victorian England* (New Haven and London, 1999); on the importance of the male breadwinner ideal in the working class see, Sonya Rose, *Limited Livelihoods. Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century England* (London, 1992).
- 16 Kathleen Canning, Feminist History after the Linguistic Turn: Historicizing Discourse and Experience *Signs* 19 (1994), pp. 368-404.
- 17 In *Soldier Heroes: British Adventures, Empire and the Imagining of Masculinities* (London and New York, 1994) Graham Dawson makes successful use of psychoanalysis for an examination of masculinity.
- 18 Roger Chartier, *Cultural History Between Practices and Representation* (Cambridge, 1988), p. 11.
- 19 For such a rewriting see, Karen Hagemann, Of 'Manly Valor' and 'German Honor': Nation, War and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising against Napoleon, *Central European History* 30 (1997), pp. 187-220.
- 20 Lynn Hunt, The Challenge of Gender. Deconstruction of Categories and Reconstruction of Narratives in Gender History in Hans Medick and Anne-Charlott Trepp (eds.), *Geschlechtergeschichte und Allgemeine Geschichte. Herausforderungen und Perspektiven* (Göttingen, 1998) pp. 57-97, 96.
- 21 Karin Hausen, Die Nicht-Einheit der Geschichte als Historiographische Herausforderung. Zur historischen Relevanz und Anstößigkeit der Geschlechtergeschichte in Medick and Trepp, *Geschlechtergeschichte*, pp. 15-55.

Discussant's Comment / Commentaire

John Horne, Ireland

Masculinity emerges in this session as a broad paradigm (codes and symbols, institutional practices, experience and memory) that sheds new light on the modern history of politics and war. Together with women's history, it can challenge conventional accounts of that history in strategically important ways – as these papers demonstrate. My remarks will concern this 'external' value of the history of masculinity.

The transformation of politics begun by the revolutions and wars of the late 18th century took real and symbolic power from monarchic and religious models of fatherhood and the family and reinvested it in citizenship and the nation. Masculinity was internalised as a source of political identity and authority in new and reformed polities. Particular models of masculinity symbolised different political systems – as Stefan Dudink shows in the case of Holland where revolutionary and military patriotism faded by comparison with a civic reformism embodied in the renegotiated image of William of Orange. Codes of masculinity structured male citizenship and political practice, as shown by Carroll Smith-Rosenberg for the 19th century United States and Thomas Welskopp for the mid-19th century German Social Democratic movement. The invention of national community was a related political development whose cultural density (already apparent in the German response to Napoleonic occupation and the Italian Risorgimento) intensified in the later 19th and early 20th centuries. Here, too, masculinity was a powerful source of identity and legitimacy, as demonstrated by Jacobus Du Pisan for Afrikaner nationalism. These three vectors of political development – state authority, citizen activism, national identity – were moulded by symbols and codes of masculinity which offer scope for extensive investigation.

War was both a vital articulation of political masculinities and a problematic field of masculine experience. From the American and French Revolutions, military service became a counter-part of citizenship (through the volunteer or the short-service conscript). As such, it democratised the warrior ethos,

reinforced masculine paradigms, and furnished myths of national identity. Yet 20th century industrialised warfare destabilised gender categories. It required the mobilisation of women and men in non-combat roles and also (in World War II) brought combat to whole populations. Contrasting variants of masculinity (and femininity) were expressed in different mobilisations for total war, as Sonya Rose shows for Britain (by comparison with Nazi Germany) in 1939-45. Also, the trauma of industrialised combat was a pervasive threat to the ideal of the democratised warrior, especially (though not exclusively) in the warfare of attrition in World War I. Michael Roper's study of how a troubled masculine self-image provoked by that trauma reworked memory through a lifetime points to the complex ways in which conflicts between gender roles and gendered experience both articulated the experience of war and sought to reabsorb it retrospectively. Post-war periods (from 1815 to 1945 and beyond) are moments when gender is particularly explicit.

The authority of the self-constituted citizen (as of the 'respectable' bourgeois or worker) was embedded in the family. Yet the family was located in class, ethnic, or racial (as well as gender) relationships which defined it in diverse ways as a source of male power and masculine identity. As direct state intervention in the family grew for medical, social, demographic or racial ends, it shaped – and was shaped by – considerations of masculinity. Marilyn Lake's exploration of how Australian male workers defended their basic family wage between the wars shows more broadly why welfare was a sphere partly shaped by masculinity as practice and power, albeit in ways that differed by country and regime. The same point deserves exploration for other spheres (e.g. education, labour relations) into which the state expanded in the 19th and 20th centuries.

National politics, war, the social action of the state are identified here as key fields in which masculinity offers new possibilities of interpretation. Other such fields – colonialism, racism – are indicated. Hints emerge on how to re-conceptualise mainstream histories in the light of masculinity and gender. Partly, this relates to the ambitions of cultural history to make explicit contemporary belief-systems and behaviours, both dominant and subordi-